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SUMMARY
Modern distributed applications are long-lived, are expected to provide flexible and
adaptive data services, and must meet the functionality and scalability challenges posed
by dynamically changing user communities in heterogeneous execution environments. The
practical implications of these requirements are that reconfiguration and upgrades are in-
creasingly necessary, but opportunities to perform such tasks offline are greatly reduced.
Developers are responding to this situation by dynamically extending or adjusting appli-
cation functionality and by tuning application performance, a typical method being the
incorporation of client- or context-specific code into applications’ execution loops.
Prior work has highlighted the performance advantages provided by dynamic code ex-
tension or specialization. Our work addresses a basic roadblock in deploying such solutions,
which is the protection of key application components and sensitive data in distributed
applications. Our approach, termed Dynamic Differential Data Protection (D3P), pro-
vides fine-grain methods for providing component-based protection in distributed applica-
tions. Context-sensitive, application-specific security methods are deployed at runtime to
enforce restrictions in data access and manipulation. D3P is suitable for use in low- or
zero-downtime environments, since such deployments are performed while applications run.
D3P is appropriate for high performance environments and for highly scalable applications
like publish/subscribe, because it creates native codes via dynamic binary code genera-
tion. Finally, due to its integration into middleware, D3P can run across a wide variety of
operating system and machine platforms.
This dissertation introduces the need for D3P, using sample applications from the high
performance and pervasive computing domains to illustrate the problems addressed by our
D3P solution. It also describes how D3P can be integrated into modern middleware. We
present experimental evaluations which demonstrate the fine-grain nature of D3P, that is,
its ability to capture individual end users’ or components’ needs for data protection, and
x




This dissertation proposes and evaluates data management methods for applications in
the high-performance and scientific domains, providing functionality and overcoming issues
not addressed by traditional techniques. For applications in these domains, where data
is generated from and distributed to heterogeneous and possibly anonymous endpoints,
our results demonstrate that non-trivial data differentiation and protection are possible
with small impact on application performance. We also show that in a significant set of
such applications, our methods improve performance over alternative solutions providing
equivalent functionality. Furthermore, we demonstrate the practicality of implementing our
solution by relying on widely-accepted data specification standards and embedding it into
a mature, high-performance data transport infrastructure.
1.1 A Distributed Application With Limited Functionality
Consider a distributed application (as in Figure 1) that transmits data from a remotely-
located sensor to an end-user application. Without using a middleware package, the devel-
oper of this application is forced to write all the communication code himself. In addition,
that communications code must is now tightly bound to the “domain” code, and changes
in one will cause either known effects in the other which must be addressed or unknown





Sensor display & control GUI
wired  / wireless network
Figure 1: A remote-sensing application.
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Simply saying “use middleware” for this problem is not a solution, however. Even if
basic problems such as abstracting communications code and wire-formatting are addressed,
several issues remain:
• How will per-user customization be handled? Many user changes to data are small and
relatively easy to implement (cropping an image, for example). However, pushing such
changes into the middleware itself dilutes the abstractions provided by the middleware.
More importantly, it forces a middleware software release cycle to occur before user
needs are satisfied, a huge barrier to user acceptance.
• How is the designer of the application to accommodate device types unknown at
design-time? A sensor application that transmits images could potentially have to
send 33% more data in order to accommodate both color and greyscale displays, for
example.
• How will applications cope with application policies unknown at design time? If ac-
tions dictated by policy (such as “Alice cannot see the northwest quadrant of the
image when the camera orientation is between north and northeast”) are usefully
implemented in middleware for performance and encapsulation reasons, how will mid-
dleware designers address these issues? What if, in the freight yard Alice is observing,
the freight car Alice is restricted from seeing moves? This invalidates the old policy
and presumably drives the creation of a new one (“northeast quadrant of the im-
age”). How will the new policy be implemented? And in general, how can policy
makers express restrictions in a way enforceable by middleware?
Existing middleware addresses many of these issues, but none in a comprehensive way.
Many middlewares support the incorporation of user codes, but the protection of the data
on which those codes operate is ignored. Middlewares that do provide implementation
of externally-defined security policies frequently do not provide ways to associate policy
information with metadata. Middleware architectures that do allow such associations (in-
corporating relational or other database mechanisms) do not scale to the data sizes, data
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distribution requirements, endpoint diversity or user populations required by modern ap-
plications. Other middleware security approaches concern themselves with policy definition
and management, authentication schemes (such as group authentication [166] or distributed
single-sign-on [111, 21, 46]), or auditing [88]. A comprehensive approach to data manage-
ment for the middleware used in streaming-data applications has heretofore been unavail-
able.
1.2 Dynamic Differential Data Protection
In comparison to such research, this dissertation focuses on more general solutions for data
management and explores how they can be leveraged to provide data protection. We pose
problems and devise solutions for:
1. Information access: typed data. How is access to remote information governed? Stated
more specifically, what access or protection model governs a remote user’s ability
to access some information items and not others? Our solution approach uses the
middleware’s type system, that is, its support for typed data, in order to support
stateful data inspection and to differentiate across multiple agents’ accesses to the
same data items.
2. Authorization: capability-based model. Once remote users have been authenticated
and have established their ability to access certain information, how to express and
implement restrictions concerning information access? Our solution uses a capability-
based model, where capabilities are associated with data streams, the data types those
streams carry, and user code designed to customize them.
3. Extension and adaptation: runtime code generation and deployment. What mecha-
nisms enforce restrictions on data access? Our solution is to use dynamically gener-
ated, safe code to implement the flexible restrictions needed by today’s applications,
and then use capabilities to express permissions and enforce restrictions on dynamic
code deployment.
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4. Locus of control: middleware- vs. system-level support. Rather than relying on spe-
cialized operating systems, our approach uses a set of middleware abstractions to
implement fine-grain restrictions on data access. The outcome is improved flexibility
and extensibility compared to system-level solutions, examples including the ability
to incorporate application-level requirements and security policies via runtime param-
eterization or the expression of utility functions.
The fundamental concept underlying (1)-(4) is that of dynamic, differential data protection
(D3P).
D3P provides differential support for protecting application data and/or components.
Data differentiation uses metadata about the application-level information being accessed
to adjust the granularity of access control. A single access control decision can be applied
to a single user or an entire application with equal ease. Differential access to data streams
produces customized, policy-driven access to data, without duplicating any stream content.
D3P leverages data differentiation to provide protection for data. A basic data access
model derived from prior work on object- and capability-based models of data protec-
tion [109] is used. In D3P, typed data is accessed and manipulated only by well-defined
operations, and applications are allowed access to exactly the types and operations specified
by policy.
To accommodate modern distributed applications, D3P permits the code fragments that
operate on data objects to be generated and deployed dynamically. Applications using D3P
react at run-time to changing end user needs or execution conditions and according to
constraints described in application policy statements.
1.3 Motivations: Data Exchange in Distributed Applications
Distributed applications and end users interact by sharing data, information, and even
devices. In scientific endeavors, for instance, researchers remotely access resources like
microscopes[8], 3D displays[128, 40], and even wish to operate sophisticated components
like the Tokomac fusion facility. In industry, companies share parts designs[30] or other
data critical to their operation. Examples include Schlumberger’s oil exploration processes
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where reservoir simulation data produced in computer centers should be shared with ’on
site’ personnel conducting drilling[140], and where simulations should use well logs to refine
current drilling procedures.example is the airline industry, as with Delta Air Lines desire to
share flight and passenger information with third parties who distribute such data to select
passengers for cellphone-based passenger notification[124]. Finally, in remote sensing and
control, radar or camera data or telemetry/biometric information is captured in order to
be forwarded to and used by interested parties, sometimes involving remote control loops
as in telesurgery, targeting, and telepresence.
In applications like these (and our example), remote users are not interested in all of the
data all of the time, and their interests can change rapidly. In fact, such dynamic interest
changes often help make the implementation of such systems or applications feasible, or
they are used to optimize implementations. Consequently, there are many models for such
changes, including context sensitivity[48] in human-centered ubiquitous applications, spa-
tial or temporal locality in pervasive and distributed systems[168, 9], and current focus or
viewpoint in remote sensing, graphics, and visualization[94]. Finally, whether implicitly de-
termined or explicitly captured by quality of service expressions[136, 137, 5], the occurrence
of dynamic interest changes in applications and systems is accompanied by the wide range
of effects they can have, starting with simple changes in data selectivity applied to ongoing
information exchanges[94], continuing with the need to apply varying transformations to
data[102], and also including real-time control reactions as in dynamic sensor repositioning
or in telepresence[29] or teleimmersive applications[139].
The target systems and applications addressed in this dissertation capture, distribute,
transform, and filter continuous data streams, in order to make appropriate data available
where and when it is needed. The importance of addressing data management may in
fact be critical to the advances sought by these applications. For such data streams, our
research attempts to bridge the gap between the essential security support provided by
authentication and encryption on the one hand and the low-level, often insufficient data
management mechanisms offered by standard middleware and operating systems on the
other hand. The specific problem we address is straightforward. End users typically organize
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data to suit their various applications’ needs, often not with protection or security in mind.
In effect, data protection may require orthogonal and complementary data organization,
distribution and access patterns than the performance or ease of use considerations typically
inherent in such applications. Examples of data organizations for protection are (1) the need
to give certain users access to some but not all of the data being transported or stored (e.g.,
removal of access to passenger information, but granting access to their food preferences), (2)
the need to protect some of the data while sharing other information, as when cooperating
researchers are happy to share ‘older’ or ‘low resolution’ results, but reserve ‘new’ or ‘high
resolution’ results for distribution after publication, (3) the need to differentially protect
certain data or certain transformations (i.e., services) performed on data, as when genome
data needs to be protected due to patenting or intellectual property restrictions, and (4)
the need to differentially secure certain data, as when sensor images may contain some
highly secure data (e.g., persons’ faces, identified military objects) that must be ‘fuzzed
out’ or ‘blacked out’ prior to distribution to others. In all such cases, security-based data
organization is orthogonal to or sometimes even contrary to data organizations required for
suitable performance in transport and access.
For any given data stream, a principal problem we address is how to protect and secure
certain data in that stream, distinguished by data type (e.g., ‘passenger id’ field of the
‘passenger’ event) or even data content (e.g., data values and positions associated with face
recognition). Furthermore, we are also concerned with the use of stream manipulations by
specific end users; these manipulations represent differential access to the data stream. In
summary, we are concerned with the provision of differential data protection for dynamic
data applications, without unnecessarily disturbing original data organization and structure.
1.4 Threat Analysis
A protection mechanism implies the existence of threats against it. Several frameworks for
modeling threats in detail exist [108, 141, 87]. At this point in our presentation, a threat
can be usefully modeled as a combination of an asset, a vulnerability, and an attacker.
Also important are the failure modes made possible by particular threats and how they are
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addressed by the mechanism.
The basic asset protected by D3P is the structured data exchanged by distributed appli-
cations. However, such data has application-level semantics associated with it. Not simply
structures, the data is a stream of images, a description of aircraft parts, or a collection
of molecules. Asset confidentiality (limiting access to the data or knowledge of its content
or semantics) and asset integrity (preserving the structure and content of the data) are
orthogonal but important aspects to consider.
The vulnerability of this data is wide-ranging. Consider the case of a sensor providing a
data stream. An attacker could gain unauthorized access to the data stream, or the ability
to corrupt it, in several ways:
• acquiring physical control of or access to the sensor, the network, or the hardware at
each application node;
• subverting the kernel- or user-level software of the operating system on any application
node; or
• subverting the application itself.
Attackers in D3P are both malicious and not so. Malicious attackers seek access to
protected data in contravention of a defined security policy, or to covertly convert data to a
form where it does not conflict with any such policy. Non-malicious attackers are those who
might inadvertently expose access to a data stream (by publicizing a stream subscription
point or installing the wrong data conversion).
Potential failure modes for applications in domains addressed by our implementation of
D3P are of two types: attacker access to data where such access is disallowed by policy, and
access to functionality where such access is similarly disallowed. Specific failure conditions
for functionality deployment can include application or node failures; incorporation of user-
specified code into an application can result in explicit termination of the application, access
to application data not protected by D3P mechanisms, exploitation of application identity
on particular hosts, and system-wide failures such as denial-of-service attacks engineered
by infinite loops.
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Middleware-level implementations of D3P obviously cannot address vulnerabilities relat-
ing to physical security of hardware devices, processing units, or network elements. Reme-
dies for such attacks are straightforward. D3P also does not address operating system level
attacks where “rootkits” or other commonly known OS vulnerabilities result in superuser-
level access to all user processes on a node. D3P protects against the use of the middleware
against itself, regulating access to middleware interfaces and guarding against inadvertent
data exposure. Also, by relying on a trusted code repository and verifying user code in-
tegrity, D3P guards against “malware”-style attacks. The philosophy of D3P, and therefore
its approach to potential threats, is well approximated by Anderson in [13]. Speaking of
cryptosystems, Anderson claims that designers focus more often on what could possibly go
wrong rather than what is likely to, and further that things likely to go wrong are issues
of implementation and management. D3P is not a cryptosystem, but the point is equally
applicable.
Also, the most serious threat to computing systems frequently stems from principals that
already have some legitimate level of access (“insiders” as referred to by Summers [152]).
Rather than guarding against random operating system vulnerabilities exploited by anony-
mous hackers, or staking out another point in the data space of systems aiming at provably
complete protection, D3P directly addresses the insider threat. Insiders in the application
domains we consider are the scientists who wish to collaborate but also wish to preserve
proprietary data, or the providers of sensor data who wish to implement tiered access for
performance and cost control. They are the users of the applications, the designers of the
data being exchanged, and D3P directly addresses a valuable subset of their data manipu-
lation and protection needs.
It is, however, important to note that the D3P model is flexible enough to allow alterna-
tive implementations. Such implementations can make use of different technology to counter
threats left unaddressed by the work described here. For example, current complementary
work proceeds on integrating safe kernel-level extension [66] and kernel-level communica-
tion [106] mechanisms with the D3P approach to policy specification and component-based
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application structure. This work will provide efficient data transport while isolating po-
tentially dangerous code segments from the application being adapted. Another implemen-
tation of D3P concepts targets data transfers on serial buses inside the kernel [113]. The
implementation we present in this dissertation is a first step in exploring how the concept
of D3P can be used to protect applications against threats at several different levels.
1.5 Thesis Statement And Dissertation Organization
This dissertation makes the following claims:
• An infrastructure for providing data differentiation and protection is a useful system
design asset in the high-performance and pervasive domains, making possible appli-
cations whose functionality and security requirements would otherwise make difficult
successful application development and deployment.
• Such an infrastructure can be implemented with small, amortized performance im-
pacts on large-data applications in those domains, and in some cases can improve
performance over alternative solutions.
Our defense of these claims in this dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2,
we examine representative applications, one each from the high-performance, pervasive,
and enterprise computing domains, and explain how D3P addresses their data security and
performance requirements. Chapter 3 presents details of our reference implementation in a
mature high-performance publish/subscribe middleware, and describes how that middleware
is used by our sample applications. We also generalize the concepts that comprise D3P,
with the aim of giving application developers a model that can be applied outside the areas
explored in this dissertation. We discuss other pieces of the infrastructure necessary to
support application design and development with D3P in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we
present a first benefit of applying such a model: providing protected access to application
configuration audit trails. We present experimental results supporting our claims for D3P
performance implications in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses related research not covered
elsewhere in the dissertation, and we present closing commentary and outline directions for
9




D3P is designed to address modern distributed applications, which are characterized by their
long lives, dynamic constraints and needs, and component-based nature. In particular:
• Distributed systems and applications are becoming increasingly long-lived. Sensor
systems continuously collect, stream, and analyze data. Global applications like grid
services must stay online around the clock to meet the needs of international scien-
tific or business processes. Therefore, changes in data protection, or more generally,
any such application-level adaptations, cannot be accommodated with methods that
require system downtime. For dynamic data protection, this means that the meth-
ods that implement them must use general solutions for in-place, online system and
application evolution, such as dynamic code generation, runtime extension, and spe-
cialization [28, 131].
• User/device needs and environmental constraints are dynamic. As a result, applica-
tions are written to dynamically accommodate new user- or domain-specific function-
ality, implemented by user- supplied or second party codes. Dynamic data protection,
therefore, must support runtime changes in application structure and in the data being
transported and manipulated by applications.
• Applications are component-based, and not all components are statically known.
Modern applications are neither deployed nor maintained in a monolithic manner.
They make heavy use of dynamically loaded library codes. New application paradigms
like peer-to-peer [99] allow for an arbitrary or unknown set of users. Reflective/introspective
development frameworks [116, 93, 115] and open standards for control transfer [35]
and data description and exchange [2] have made it difficult for application developers
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to know a priori about all communication types or methods and the range of execu-
tion environments used by applications. For dynamic data protection, this implies
that dynamic configuration changes in applications must be addressed as a first-class
design goal.
The primary contribution of D3P is that it can deal with middleware systems along
each of these three axes differentially. That is, where previous systems have only allowed
their users or developers coarse-grain ways of dealing with changing user populations (to
either allow unknown users or not), data definitions (preventing the use of low-display-
capability hand-held devices in rich scientific visualization settings), or restricting dynamic
functionality to a set of pre-loaded binary libraries, D3P systems can make differential
decisions, according to application security policy. For example, users who are not allowed
by application security designers to view particular fields in a data type can be prevented
from seeing exactly those fields, rather than being restricted from seeing the type altogether.
D3P provides a method of avoiding such all-or-nothing decisions.
The threat model faced by such applications is varied. Active threats, where actors
either known or unknown to the application take specific, deliberate actions to gain unau-
thorized access to data, damage data integrity, or modify system configurations in order to
degrade or halt application execution are possible. For instance, user-specified code that
purports to perform a given task but in reality modifies data could be loaded as an appli-
cation extension. Passive threats involve mostly loss of confidentiality of information in an
application, rather than its integrity or damage to application execution itself. In appli-
cations that communicate via streaming data, as do those we consider here, this threat is
most commonly realized through unchecked or unauthorized subscriptions to data streams.
Execution-based threats such as denial or theft of application services are also possible;
for example, users may be able to subscribe to data streams that have been processed by
methods not paid for (e.g. face recognition in image streams) or supply an adaptation that
stops application execution (a shared object file whose code contains an infinite loop).
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D3P directly addresses threats in these categories. Active threats are countered by
maintaining specific policy information regarding users and system extensions, and gov-
erning which users can install which extensions. Extensions are assumed to be verified by
means outside the D3P system (formal verification or inspection), but once this verification
has taken place and the extension code signed, D3P guarantees only that particular code
can be loaded by any authorized user. Eavesdropping is not possible in a D3P system, as
any access to a data stream must be checked against security policy. Subscription to a data
stream requires authorization by a trusted policy module. There is also no way for threat ac-
tors to browse application information (such as the collection of data types available); users
are given access to exactly the data types required for their execution needs and no others.
Finally, the trusted policy manager used in a D3P-based system only allows registration
of application adaptation code by known and authorized users, reducing the chance that
malicious adaptations can be introduced. Theft of application services is prevented by sup-
plying users with references to data streams containing “finished” data, where authorized
actions (such as face recognition) have already been applied, and disallowing unchecked
stream subscription or adaptation.
The D3P model relies on the integrity of the trusted policy manager. If this process is
subverted or successfully impersonated, the data protection mechanism cannot provide the
guarantees we have discussed. Cryptographic techniques (e.g. shared-secret identification)
are used to confirm the identity of the policy manager, and stronger identification methods
can be introduced into the D3P model without loss of generality or functionality. Proof
against subversion is provided through operating system facilities, the presumption of code
inspection/verification involved in any software module assumed trusted, and hard-coded
auditing tools which produce records of the module’s actions.
The following sections examine the need for and utility of D3P in three representative
applications: (1) a surveillance system that uses remote cameras to capture and inspect
images; (2) a high performance application used by scientists to collaborate in real-time via
meaningful remote data visualizations; and (3) an enterprise-scale system where multiple
business partners require different views on the same data.
13






for (i=0;i < input.size; i = i + 1) {
   }
}
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installation of image filters
Figure 2: The AVS (Active Video Streams) application.
Consider the simple surveillance application depicted in Figure 2, which shows the com-
ponent architecture of the Active Video Streams (AVS) utility developed by our group.
AVS [171] emulates the basic functionality of remote sensor-based applications. AVS typi-
fies such applications in that it streams data captured by a remote sensor, exemplified by
a camera, and transmits them to interested consumers. To enable rich image analysis, un-
compressed data is transferred using the PPM industry-standard image format, as 640x480
PPM image frames, approximately of size 960Kb each. In our simple demo application,
these frames are consumed and displayed by a Java image viewer that emulates the control
panel used in a surveillance application. In generalizations of applications like these, analy-
sis functions are applied to incoming image data before it is displayed, automatically or as
needed (e.g., initiated by surveillance personnel) [3].
A basic trade-off in remote sensor processing, especially across the wireless communi-
cation platforms for which AVS is intended, is the delay in data transmission from sensor
to viewer vs. the quality of sensor data received and analyzed. AVS provides multiple
sensor-resident data filters that implement suitable trade-offs. Specifically, AVS allows each
consumer to customize the image stream by dynamically introducing a data reduction (fil-
ter) function into the data path.
Among these actions are greyscale, where the RGB color image is downsampled to a




(b) A viewer displays a video stream and gives access to possible adaptations.
Figure 3: Command Center Interface.
dimensions; and crop, where a portion of the image is selected by the user and the remainder
discarded. Each of these functions implements a different trade-off in the amount of data
transferred across the wireless network link and therefore, the delay in data transfer vs. the
utility of the data received by surveillance personnel. Whether customized or not, image
frames are represented and transmitted as structured data packets as shown below.
#define AVSIMAGE1C      921600  /* 640 * 480 - color */
typedef struct {
  int tag;
  char ppm1;
  char ppm2;
  int size;
  int width;
  int height;
  int maxval;
  char buff[AVSIMAGE1C];
} Raw_data1C, *Raw_data1C_ptr;
Figure 4: C language structure representing a PPM image used by the AVS application.
AVS provides a rich environment for defining security policy, where usage semantics and
access policies for users, devices, customizations and streams must all be coordinated. D3P
addresses these needs as follows:
• The primary access control decision for AVS is whether a user can view images on
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a particular stream. AVS has a type system that is used for selection of streams —
users choose to view a 640x480 color image stream as opposed to a 320x240 greyscale
stream, for example, and these streams are implemented using different data types.
D3P permits policy to leverage the type system. That is, D3P supports access control
decisions by restricting access to the type and thereby the image data.
• D3P enforces access control decisions by issuing capabilities for data and types,
thereby removing from developers the need to make authentication and authoriza-
tion decisions. Instead, with D3P, one simply presents the capabilities provided by
the user to the middleware. If the capabilities allow the requested access, it is granted.
This frees the AVS developer to concentrate on building the best image display and
manipulation application possible, instead of worrying about access control.
• Concerns about the mechanics of installing user-directed adaptations are also relieved
by D3P. Using the same capability model that governs access control, installing adap-
tations on image streams simply involves presenting the appropriate capabilities to
the middleware. Integration with the type system is also implicit, as the same ca-
pability access model is used. An example is downsampling, where a user wishes to
improve frame rate by reducing the amount of data transmitted. In AVS, the user
can install an adaptation on a color image stream which produces a greyscale image
stream. D3P reduces this operation to the presentation of the appropriate capabilities
for the existing stream, the adaptation, and the data types involved. Installation of
the handler, retrieval of the new type information, and construction of the new image
stream are all performed automatically.
This analysis shows how the D3P approach to middleware can have direct and immediate
benefits for application developers in the pervasive domain. Similar advantages can be
enjoyed by high-performance computing applications, as we discuss in the following section.
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2.2 High Performance Computing: Data-centric Collabora-
tion
Consider the exchange of technical data between collaborating scientists or engineers. Ap-
plications in which such data exchanges take place are those built with the SmartPointer
framework for real-time scientific collaboration developed by our group [174]. As depicted
in Figure 5, scientists can share visual displays of output data generated by a high perfor-
mance simulation, they can view data across heterogeneous network links and on different
display devices, and they can select at runtime the subsets they wish to view and/or analyze
of the large output data sets generated by the running simulation.
Figure 5: The SmartPointer application. Scientific users can share information about the
molecular dynamics simulations on heterogeneous output devices ranging from wirelessly-
connected handhelds to those with advanced 3-dimensional rendering capabilities.
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Two concrete examples of desired data sharing are: (1) a scientist viewing only the cop-
per atoms (and their behaviors) simulated by a running molecular dynamics simulation vs.
(2) another scientist interested only in the chemical bond data computed from simulation
output by running certain analyses across that output. In both cases, middleware repre-
sents simulation output as well as the products of output analyses as structured data types.
The data stream produced by a simulation may be customized with dynamically generated
code in the same manner as AVS image streams. Some of these customizations concern
access restrictions. Such restrictions are particularly important in large-scale collaborations
like DOE’s ongoing Supernova Initiative, where a multi-disciplinary team of scientists is
investigating the complex processes ongoing in a supernova explosion. Here, conflicts arise
between the necessity to collaborate in order to make progress and the desire to protect
“proprietary” data and/or methods. Controls over data sharing and flexible access policies
are vital in these cases. Similar scenarios occur in industrial collaborations, where subcon-
tractors with technical expertise in particular areas need carefully-specified and monitored
access to valuable engineering data.
As with the AVS example above, D3P makes possible solutions that directly address
these issues. In the specific case of the SmartPointer application:
• The data exchanged by the components of SmartPointer are represented as structured
data types. These structures may contain both simulation output and analytical
results. D3P uses the structure definitions provided by the users of the application
to define fine-grained access policies. Users are not required to think about security
restrictions, other than in terms of the structure of the data they are generating and
analyzing (with which they are intimately familiar!).
It should be stressed here that the users of the application are not primarily software
developers and do not necessarily have experience with the middleware used to im-
plement SmartPointer. In effect, D3P leverages users’ experience with the structure
of the data they are generating and analyzing. D3P provides the means to directly
leverage that experience when performing access control.
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• SmartPointer and similar applications are used by diverse groups of researchers, sep-
arated by geography, administrative structures, and research domains. Control over
data access and system customization is made much more difficult when users belong
to such decentralized groups. Using D3P-capable middleware moves the expression of
control over data access (i.e., the definition of security policy) out of the application
and into more-easily-verified trusted policy modules. This is done in a decentral-
ized fashion using D3P capabilities, the latter being abstract, revocable, and portable
instruments.
• A key attribute of applications like SmartPointer is that end users are the ones who
express the ways in which data streams should be customized. D3P directly sup-
ports user-driven ways to extend or adapt applications, independent of geographical
and organizational considerations. The approach is to integrate the type definitions
provided by researchers, their customization code, and security policy (likely defined
by non-researchers) into a single system. The mechanics of system adaptation work
identically for all users, and security decisions are encapsulated into capabilities. The
efficiency of data transfer is preserved by the use of dynamic code generation.
Consider the threats to data protection involved in such applications. A passive actor
could gain access to proprietary supernova simulation data simply through the application
itself by simply browsing the available data streams. Active threat actors could seriously
degrade the execution of vital simulations by introducing denial-of-service adaptations. In
an unprotected SmartPointer application, all users would have access to all data types
provided by the application and be able to use them to synthesize new streams. D3P
explicitly guards against each of these types of threats, by requiring authorized access to
data streams, data types, and adaptations.
2.3 Enterprise Applications
The past several years have been a period of considerable upheaval in the enterprise systems
area. In order to reduce costs and improve service offerings, major information systems
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integration efforts have been undertaken. These efforts often include attempts to tap into
the vast amount of real-time and near-real-time data stored in legacy databases, and re-
purpose or otherwise manipulate that data in support of new functional or competitive
requirements.
Such an effort, described in [124], is the construction of a Operational Information
Systems (OIS) mid-tier at Delta Air Lines. OIS (Figure 6) is designed to “mine” the
legacy online transaction processing infrastructure, deriving new business data from existing
processes with minimal disruption. Scalability of OIS is a primary concern, as the number
of endpoints for such data is potentially in the hundreds of thousands.
Figure 6: Architecture of the Operational Information Systems mid-tier.
The primary purpose of OIS is the dissemination of existing or newly synthesized data.
However, even among data intended for the same class of endpoints (business partners such
as caterers, for example), there are data sharing issues. Caterers should not have access
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to entire passenger records; meal preferences are valid data to pass along but names and
addresses are not. Fuel vendors at airports might need specially synthesized records in order
to properly provision local fuel services. Law enforcement agencies may need on-demand
access to customized data streams derived from OIS.
D3P provides unique and novel facilities to address these concerns:
• Many middlewares ship unstructured data in enterprise applications such as OIS.
However, the rise in popularity of XML has increased the incidence of structured data.
Where structured data and sufficient metadata exist (as in XML-based middleware
or hybrid solutions [144] which switch between text and binary message structure and
content), D3P can provide flexible data protection. Developers of the “data taps”
that comprise OIS-like applications can create D3P policy independently of other
data streams being generated from the same source.
• The set of interested parties for enterprise data is large. Business partners, consumers
both inside and outside the enterprise, and external agencies such as regulatory bodies
or law enforcement organizations may all have valid data inspection or usage needs.
Creating policy for such diverse groups of users would be extremely problematic in
a development environment that did not support decentralized policy definition and
management. D3P-enabled middleware allows decentralized establishment of policy in
rapidly-changing enterprise information system architectures. Separate policies acting
on the same data stream can be simultaneously developed and deployed for both law
enforcement agencies and caterers, without requiring data to be duplicated.
• The attractiveness of the OIS “data tap” philosophy is that multiple new applica-
tions can be developed on an ad hoc basis without disrupting existing data streams.
Synthesis of new data streams required by new applications is accomplished by in-
jecting application-specific functionality. D3P directly supports this paradigm. D3P
further provides unrelated application development teams the ability to define their
own metadata and policy information. This keeps development impact small and
increases the flexibility and responsiveness of new applications.
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• OIS is fundamentally a middleware solution to the problem of developing and de-
ploying new enterprise applications. D3P provides middleware interfaces for modular
development of such applications and as such is correctly targeted for OIS. Further-
more, without the ability to incorporate user-defined policy provided by D3P, many
OIS applications would not be realizable at reasonable execution costs.
In this chapter, we discussed the application domain which D3P addresses and the types
of protection threats D3P does and does not provide leverage against. We presented ex-
ample applications from each of the pervasive, high-performance, and enterprise computing
domains. In each case, D3P makes possible unique and novel solutions to the problem of
managing data-centric application development.
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CHAPTER 3
AN IMPLEMENTATION OF D3P IN
PUBLISH/SUBSCRIBE MIDDLEWARE
In order to explore application development with D3P, a concrete implementation of D3P
concepts has been created with a mature, high-performance middleware library. We note,
however, that the concepts of D3P are suitable for a wide variety of middleware. The key
requirements are the availability of a type system (through either metadata or reflection)
and the ability to dynamically associate functionality at a link endpoint. We choose to
implement D3P in publish/subscribe middleware for two reasons: (1) the classes of applica-
tions we target make heavy use of publish/subscribe concepts, and (2) we have at hand a
mature publish/subscribe middleware package called ECho.
In this section, we present interesting details of a concrete implementation of D3P
principles. Among these are the necessity to control access to middleware objects, the
management of application functional and security policy, and implementing differential
data protection through the application of user- and policy-specified functionality to data
streams. We ground our discussion by first describing the fundamentals of the middleware
library we use as a starting point.
3.1 ECho Fundamentals
ECho [52] is data delivery middleware for the high performance and pervasive domains, tar-
geting interactive scientific collaboration, remote instruments and visualization, and similar
large-data applications. Superficially, the semantics and organization of structures in ECho
are similar to the Event Channels described by the CORBA Event Services specification[76],
implementing an anonymous group communication mechanism. Data senders in anonymous
group communication are unaware of the number or identity of data receivers. Instead, data











Figure 7: Processes using Event Channels for Communication.
case, event channels provide the mechanism for matching senders and receivers. Data mes-
sages (or events) are sent via sources into channels which may have zero or more subscribers
(or sinks). The locations of the sinks, which may be on the same machine or process as the
sender, or anywhere else in the network, are immaterial to the sender.
A program or system may create or use multiple event channels, and each subscriber
receives only the messages sent to the channel to which it is subscribed. The network
traffic for multiple channels is multiplexed over shared communications links, and channels
themselves impose relatively low overhead. Instead of doing explicit read() operations, sink
subscribers specify an upcall to be run whenever a message arrives. In this sense, event
delivery is asynchronous and passive for the application.
Event channels are distributed entities, with bookkeeping data in each process where
they are referenced. Channels are created once by some process, and opened anywhere else
they are used. The process that creates an event channel is distinguished in that it is the
contact point for other processes wishing to use the channel. The channel ID, which must
be used to open the channel, contains contact information for the creating process as well as
information identifying the specific channel. However, event distribution is not centralized
and there are no distinguished processes during event propagation. Event messages are
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always sent directly from an event source to all subscribers.
ECho channels can be either typed or untyped. The type system for typed channels is
managed by PBIO (Portable Binary I/O) [23]. PBIO allows high-level description of data
to be efficiently represented and transmitted in binary form. PBIO transparently handles
binary translation issues such as differing machine word sizes or word endian-ness, provides
facilities for compile-time or run-time type definition, and performs type reflection and
conversion between compatible types.
3.2 Overview Of Basic ECho/D3P Usage
An application E using ECho to transmit or receive data follows a general form. E creates
a ECho context object, uses that object to obtain a handle for an event channel, and then
establishes access to the channel as either a source or a sink. An application D using the
D3P version of ECho follows a similar pattern, but with some additional steps involved.
We will now describe this process in a general fashion, in order to provide context for more
detailed discussion to follow later in this chapter.
The most significant change is communication with a trusted security and policy man-
agement service called Overwatch. An Overwatch daemon executes on each host in a D3P
application. When D performs the ECho library call to create a context object, it now
must supply some form of authentication token that the local Overwatch can understand.
The library call in this case, into a version of ECho that has been D3P-enabled, relays
this token to the local Overwatch instance. The local instance verifies the token (in an
implementation- and policy-dependent manner) and responds with a verification message.
This message contains enough information for ECho/D3P to construct the context object
and return it to the caller.
This protected context object is then used, either directly or indirectly, in all subsequent
ECho operations performed by D. If D is an event subscriber, the context object is used to
acquire a channel handle and then subscribe as a sink. In this case, the D3P middleware
extracts the protection information from the context object and supplies it to Overwatch
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as proof of the calling application’s identity. Overwatch verifies that this protection in-
formation is valid and consults an internal policy brokering engine to determine which, if
any, specific channel handle should be provided to D. In making this decision, Overwatch
acts pursuant to application policy and functional information provided to it by application
and/or system administrators. ECho/D3P receives a correct handle from Overwatch and
constructs a suitable channel object for the application. That channel object can then be
used to subscribe for data events.
This overview has been abstract in terms of the objects actually manipulated by such
an application D. In the following section, we discuss concrete realizations for these objects
and the requirements imposed by the design goals of D3P.
3.3 Implementing Protected Objects
In this section we discuss the implementation of protected object references for D3P. After
presenting those details, we consider the differing protection guarantees provided by the
D3P model and its reference implementation.
3.3.1 Protected References to ECho Objects
Ordinary ECho objects are C-language structures, produced by unprotected library rou-
tines. In order to implement the D3P protection actions described above, it is necessary to
devise some method of controlling access to the creation and manipulation of those objects.
The initial design for this task involved a “wrapper” library which completely encapsulated
ECho and performed access checks on a per-function call basis. Once access rights were
inspected, execution was delegated to the proper ECho library call. This approach was
abandoned due to the amount of code that would have to change in applications already
using ECho.
Adopting a design goal of minimizing source code changes to the ECho API (and there-
fore to applications), we choose to modify ECho objects themselves. To do this, we adopt
the capability as a guiding abstraction. Canonically defined by Dennis and Van Horn[47], a
capability can be abstracted as a unforgeable combination of a reference to an object with
rights applicable to that object. In capability-based systems, all references to objects are
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made through capabilities, and no access is allowed or even possible outside the capability
mechanism.
Proof against forgery is provided in different ways, depending upon the level at which
capabilities are used. Early systems such as the Chicago Magic Number Machine [177]
and the Cambridge CAP [119] computer used capabilities to refer to memory segments,
and prevented forgery by requiring that capabilities and user data never reside in the same
segment. The Hydra [109] operating system kernel broadened the scope of capabilities to
refer to all objects in the system (including both physical resources such as disks and I/O
devices and logical resources such as files, processes, and procedures). Hydra’s capabilities
were software-based, and capability integrity was enforced by the kernel (requiring frequent
and costly domain switching). IBM’s System/38 [110] and Intel’s i432 [34] architectures
moved these operations to the microcode and silicon levels, respectively.
This research aims to use capabilities in user-level software, to protect user-level ob-
jects. These objects are simply bit patterns in user memory, and to completely protect
them would require either a machine architecture designed from the ground up to support
capabilities [34, 173] or complicated memory protection arrangements. D3P’s aims are dif-
ferent, in that high performance and application-specific adaptability are primary goals; our
intentions in the protection world are to explore enough of this design space to justify fur-
ther research into more complete protection solutions. Consequently, the protection against
capability forgery in this implementation D3P middleware is straightforward: language-
level opacity is used to prevent direct programmatic manipulation of ECho objects, and
protection against forgery takes two forms. The first is to ensure that a capability is au-
thentic; that is, its reference and rights information can be regarded as genuine or approved
by policy. The second is to ensure that an authentic capability cannot be modified. We
implement the first form through signatures that use shared-key cryptography. Specifically,
a ciphertext generated using an encryption key belonging to the service that signs capabil-
ities is installed at the same time as ECho. This ciphertext is included in each successful
capability request and then embedded in the capability. ECho then verifies the authenticity
of the capability by comparing the capability ciphertext against the known ciphertext. To
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guard against rights manipulation, a digest of the ECho object is created when a capability
creation or modification request is granted or when a revocation occurs. This hash is veri-
fied when the capability is used in order to ensure that rights have not been unexpectedly
changed.
This implementation of D3P is subject to vulnerabilities involving user-space code and
data access. Ongoing research provides ways in which these vulnerabilities of the D3P
implementation can be removed, and there are several research efforts [38, 32] which can
improve the security of D3P implemented in user-level software. Also, as noted previously,
other research [66] by our group aims to provide more complete protection mechanisms
while still supporting the application performance and adaptability goals of D3P.
3.3.2 ECho Object Modifications
The “bootstrap” ECho object is the EControlContext (ECC); all other ECho operations
require its cooperation. For D3P, the API for creating an ECC is modified to send a
list of attributes to Overwatch. Overwatch responds to a successful request with a list of
attributes containing its signature (to indicate success and to identify which Overwatch
service responded) and a list of object rights for the new ECC (whether it can be used to
create channels, open already-created channels, or both). This attribute list is then installed
into a newly created object, converting the newly created ECC object into a capability. A
flag is also set in the object to indicate that it is a capability; if an application attempts
to use it in a non-D3P ECho library call, the middleware will spot the flag and refuse to
continue the operation. Protected ECC objects can be used to create other protected ECho
objects (which are themselves modified to act as capabilities).
Each ECho object creation API verifies that the ECC capability provided is valid and
allows the creation of the object in question. For example, the event channel object in ECho
is EChannel. The EChannel create() call examines the provided ECC, verifying both the
object signature and that the ECC contains a “create-channel” right.
The PBIO library also provides a set of objects used to represent data types and col-
lections of those types. Capabilities for PBIO types are also obtained in cooperation with
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the Overwatch process, in a manner similar to ECho objects. Data protection policy may
only grant an application knowledge of a certain set of data types. PBIO defines a lo-
cal dictionary of types known as an IOContext. Event submission in unprotected ECho
requires an EControlContextand a specification of the type of the event. The analo-
gous call in ECho/D3P is to provide capabilities for both the EControlContextand the
IOContextcontaining the type in question.
3.3.2.1 Implementation Of Capabilities
The set of information that makes an ECho object into a capability is stored in an attr-list.
attr-lists are supported by a separate library in the ECho software stack and provide
serializable representations for arbitrary collections of data. Each item in the attr-list is
called an attr. Typical attrs required for D3P capabilities include:
• The Overwatch ciphertext used for validating a capability;
• A rights mask for the object. For example, an EControlContext can possibly indicate
rights for creating a channel or opening a channel; and
• A digest of the successfully created object’s content (the default hashing algorithm is
MD5 [135]).
The definition of each ECho object used as a capability was changed to include an
attr-list. We use attribute lists in part to promote compatibility between future different
flavors of D3P. It is conceivable that different implementations of the Overwatch service
might provide multiple signature representations, each of which might be stored in a single
attribute list. Although our current work does not address delegation of capabilities outside
a single address space, we expect this flexibility to pay dividends in more distributed D3P
environments.
3.4 Implementing Per-Client Customization
In this section, we describe ECho’s facilities for performing per-client customization of event
delivery. We then describe how the D3P implementation makes use of these facilities.
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3.4.1 Customizing Event Delivery In ECho
ECho directly supports client customization of an event channel through the association of
functionality with a link endpoint. Customization of an ECho channel in such a manner
results in the creation of a derived channel (Figure 8). Derived event channels execute the
function supplied during their derivation at the event source. The result of the function
controls whether the event is sent to any subscribers of the derived channel. A critical
issue in the implementation for ECho’s derived event channels is the nature of the function
and its specification. Since the function is specified by the client but must be evaluated at
the (possibly remote) source, a simple function pointer is obviously insufficient. There are
several possible approaches to this problem, including:
• severely restricting the function specification language, perhaps to a set of relational,
equality and logical operators;
• using a generic, language such as C, but relying on pre-generated shared object files;
or
• using interpreted code, like Tcl/Tk [125] or Java [107].
Having a relatively restricted filter language is the approach chosen in CORBA Noti-
fication Services [77] and in Siena [26]. While this facilitates efficient interpretation, the
restricted language may not be able to express the full range of conditions useful to an











Figure 8: Derived event channels are created by applying a function to the output of an
existing event channel.
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Once agreed that a more general programming language is a better alternative, a remain-
ing question is its translation in heterogeneous environments. One might consider supplying
these functions in the form of a shared object file that could be dynamically linked into
the application or an event source. Using shared objects allows these functions to be more
general, but requires the client to supply them in a native object file for each possible desti-
nation. This is relatively easy in a homogeneous system, but becomes increasingly difficult
as heterogeneity is introduced.
In order to avoid problems with heterogeneity one might supply such functions in an
interpreted language such as a Tcl or Java. This would allow general functions and alleviate
the difficulties with heterogeneity, but it would impact efficiency. Because of our focus on
high performance computing and since most handlers we have found are quite simple, we
have chosen a different approach that maintains high efficiency at some price in flexibility.
We express functions in ECL, a subset of C, and resort to dynamic code generation to
create efficient native versions of such functions on the target host. ECL may be extended
as future needs warrant, but currently it is a subset of C, supporting the C operators, for
loops, if statements and return statements. For experimentation, however, and in order
to consider potential useful extensions to ECL, we have also enabled the use of general
C-based shared-object modules.
ECL’s dynamic code generation capabilities are based on Icode, an internal interface
developed at MIT as part of the ’C project [129]. Icode is itself based on Vcode [54], also
developed at MIT by Dawson Engler. Vcode supports dynamic code generation for MIPS,
Alpha and Sparc processors. It has been extended to support MIPS n32 and 64-bit ABIs,
Sparc 64-bit ABI, and x86 processors1. Vcode offers a virtual RISC instruction set for
dynamic code generation. The Icode layer adds register allocation and assignment. ECL
consists primarily of a lexer, parser, semanticizer and code generator.
Figure 3.4.1 shows an example of a handler extracted from the SmartPointer application2.2.
The handler computes (and passes) the average size of molecules in a given region.
1Integer x86 support was developed at MIT. Vcode was extended to support the x86 floating point




double sum = 0.0;
for (i = 0; i < 37; i = i + 1) {
for (j = 0; j < 253; j = j + 1) {
sum = sum + input.molecule_size[j][i];
}
}
































Figure 9: Installing a handler in AVS requires the use of several D3P objects. An ECon-
trolContext (1) is needed in order to create any other protected ECho objects. Capabilities
for the original, unmodified EChannel (2), the PBIO types involved (the type used in the
original channel and the one to be generated by the newly installed handler, in an PBIO
IOContext) (3), and for the handler itself (4) are required for the handler installation. Com-
munication with Overwatch (5) is necessary to retrieve at least the handler capability. The
result of the operation (6) is a new protected EChannel object (7) which can then be used
by AVS.
3.4.2 Using ECho Derived Channels
In order to create a protected derived channel, capabilities for the EControlContext, the
original EChannel, any types involved, and the handler must be provided. The capability
for the handler is also obtained from Overwatch; the user specifies a list of attributes of
the desired handler (to execute locally or at a remote location, whether a DLL version is
necessary, and other characteristics) and Overwatch acts as a broker to provide the correct
handler code. Also, the EChannelcapability must contain a “can-derive” right, indicating
that the holder of the capability has the right to install a handler on it. The result of this
operation is another EChannelcapability which refers to the newly derived channel.
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3.4.3 Providing Efficient Data Protection Through Type Manipulation
D3P provides data protection through type manipulation. In the strongly-typed, pub-
lish/subscribe application space we are considering, not having access to the data type
provided by a particular service is functionally equivalent to not having access to the ser-
vice. Without access to the type of data being transmitted, there is no way to reliably
unmarshal data for use by the application. Providing differential access to services for
applications becomes a question of providing differential access to strongly-typed data.
The D3P mechanism directly addresses this by requiring capability-based access to all
middleware services. Forcing applications to acquire capabilities provides a level of indi-
rection which we use as a hook to enforce policy. If application policies dictate that Alice
should not have access to high-resolution sensor data, her attempt to acquire a capability
from Overwatch for a channel carrying that data will fail. If policy statements forbid ap-
plications with certain attributes to install data transformation handlers on a particular
channel, any attempt to acquire a capability from Overwatch for that handler and channel
will fail.
It would be possible to customize streaming data services for individual users or ap-
plications by providing a completely separate stream each time one is needed. Consider
Alice’s situation described above; she is prohibited from accessing high-resolution sensor
data (call this type H), but assume for a moment that she is allowed to see lower-resolution
data (type L). A naive design for this situation establishes two separate data streams, with
appropriate access controls for each. This wastes network capacity, as data is duplicated
for the low-resolution stream.
D3P provides true differential access to the data in question. In order to prevent Alice
from seeing prohibited data, Overwatch instructs the middleware to install a handler de-
signed to customize the data stream in exactly the right way. This customization converts
the data type from H (naming and containing high-definition sensor data) to a new type
L that potentially has no naming or structural similarity to the first. In fact, Alice is not
even aware of the existence or structure of H, since the middleware in conjunction with
Overwatch substitutes a reference to a channel providing L data without her knowledge.
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She cannot use the middleware facilities to convert L data to or from H.
Key to the efficiency of differential data protection is that the handler executes at the
source of the data, minimizing data duplication and thus preserving network bandwidth.
Any other application users in the same user class as Alice (that is, with access only to type
L) will be given a capability to the channel originally established for Alice, further reducing
bandwidth and processing wastage.
3.4.4 a priori Channel Customization
The attractiveness of application design in a D3P environment stems from the ability to
establish, at design-time, a set of customizations that may be commonly needed. For
instance, in the AVS application, the different image-processing algorithms are supplied
as handlers which can be invoked by users or by Overwatch as necessary. This removes
from application developers the need to take explicit action to ensure compliance with
security policy. Contrast this with the need for UNIX programs that are installed with
administrator privileges to explicitly give up those privileges as soon as possible to prevent
security breaches. D3P middleware never transmits data to a user that should not see it,
because protection actions are enforced by handlers that execute at data sources.
Application design then becomes more manageable in several ways. D3P promotes
component-based application design, by encouraging the movement of functional elements
into handlers. Applications become easier to reason about as a consequence. Data protec-
tion actions are removed from the application and encapsulated in the trusted Overwatch
module. Finally, application policy is no longer implicit and static in the design of ap-
plications, but is made explicit and dynamic by the interaction between policy designers,
Overwatch, and D3P middleware.
3.5 Overwatch, Application Metadata, And Policy Manage-
ment
D3P is a data protection and manipulation mechanism, designed to be driven by application
policy. The design intention was to remain policy-agnostic; as long as there is an Overwatch
policy manager that can sign capabilities for the middleware, according to the rules laid out
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by application policy, the specific implementation or behavior of Overwatch isn’t impor-
tant. The D3P model is intentionally vague on this point, to allow for the development of
different kinds of Overwatch modules encapsulating different approaches to data protection
policy management. In this section, we describe the operation of our prototype instance of
Overwatch.
3.5.1 Overwatch Basics
Overwatch is a distributed service that runs on each host participating in a D3P-enabled
application. The executable itself is a Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP [35]) service
constructed using the gSOAP [159] toolkit. Applications running on a particular host
attempt first to contact the local instance of Overwatch; if a local instance does not exist
or is incapacitated, a remote instance may be contacted. If no Overwatch instances are
available, D3P services are not provided and applications are so informed through their
ECho object creation calls.
The primary responsibilities of Overwatch are to (1) authenticate users based on creden-
tials they present, and (2) determine which requests to grant based on such authentication
and policy statements registered by applications and component developers.
Authentication is performed by comparing a username/password pair in an initial re-
quest to the information available from /etc/passwd on the system where the receiving
Overwatch instance runs (typically this is the local instance of Overwatch and thus the local
password file). Alternative authentication mechanisms include custom challenge/response
schemes or PKI-based approaches. In a PKI-based system, the application provides an
X.509v3-compliant identity certificate[86], whose signer is checked against an internal list
of trusted certification authorities.
Authorization (deciding which requests to grant capabilities for) is a more complicated
operation. It is implementation-defined, depending on the intersection of available resources,
operations, and policy statements about principals. In our reference implementation, Over-
watch uses initial metadata about local applications and extensions in conjunction with
information about users. This metadata is maintained dynamically by administrators, and
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Figure 10: Use of metadata in the AVS application.
is used to generate handler capabilities for use by D3P applications. In the following section,
we describe the structure of this metadata.
3.5.2 Metadata Used by Overwatch
Overwatch is initialized with two sets of data. The first is a collection of profile information
corresponding to applications and their users. These profiles contain policy statements
for users relative to data types and transformations available for each application. For
instance, a profile might indicate that Alice is restricted from seeing an array of high-
resolution sensor data contained in a particular application data type. The second is a
description of transformations available for each application and actions that can be taken.
Consider as an example the set of actions available in the AVS application. One potential
action is to blur or otherwise obscure a region of the image. This is implemented as a
mathematical operation on the image pixels, which can be as complicated as a customized
blurring algorithm or as simple as setting each pixel in the affected area to 0. Defining
“affected area” is also crucial here; AVS works with rectangular images and so adopts a
compass-oriented quadrant system. Figure10 illustrates this process in more detail.
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In this example, a policy applicable to all AVS users is defined in which the “north-
west” and “south-west” regions of the image must be obscured when condition A holds
(the must-blur element in the XML policy document). In a fully-realized D3P application,
condition A would be something obtained from the current environment or execution context
of the application. Examples of such conditions include “the camera is pointing between 20
and 90 degrees”, “the time of day is between 0600 and 1200”, or “the installation security
status is elevated”. The D3P infrastructure assumes the ability to acquire such information
dynamically and with small delay. This is an area where proactive directory services assist
greatly; Section 4.2 describes such a service more fully.
It should be noted that, although this example deals with a security-oriented scenario,
this same approach can be used for instances more related to application functionality.
For example, instead of policy metadata referring to a security action (must-blur), con-
sider a policy designed to make AVS more usable by weak-display endpoints. Instead of a
must-blur predicate, must-downsample might specify that any stream subscription should
have its images downsampled from color to greyscale (thereby reducing the data transmitted
by two-thirds assuming image representation as in AVS). When users request capabilities
for image streams and this policy is in force, a downsampling filter is installed without user
intervention or even user knowledge. From the display-challenged user’s point of view, the
only streams available are those that are determined by policy administrators (presumably
in consultation with developers) to best accommodate their display and connectivity. In
this manner, Overwatch “differentially” supports vital application functionality.
Handler metadata is the other type of metadata required by Overwatch. This metadata
describes the operation of a handler, which data types it requires, and which Overwatch-
brokered actions it supports. For each handler used by an application, a metadata fragment
like that depicted in Figure10 is supplied to Overwatch by administrators. The code for
the handler can either be provided in-line as ECL, or a URL can be supplied for a remote
location where ECL or a binary object can be obtained. For brokering purposes, the actions
fragment is most interesting. Each sub-element of actions has a name that is used to match
requested actions in policy metadata. As in the example, specifying must-blur in the policy
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statement will trigger a search for handlers claiming to implement the blur action in their
metadata statement. If no such handlers are found among those registered with Overwatch,
any requests for capabilities depending on them will fail2 Each blur action defines a set
of parameters, in this case the regions of the image that this particular handler is able to
obscure.
When Overwatch receives the request for a capability, the principal making the request
is first authenticated as described above. Then, the set of application policy statements is
searched for items applicable either to all users or the principal making the request. If any
handlers are required to be pre-installed, Overwatch includes in its response a directive for
the middleware to install the handler and create a new ECho channel, returning the new
channel to the application. Overwatch’s signature is then applied to the resulting ECho
object and the object’s handle is returned to the caller.
Developers creating extensions for applications such as AVS must provide definitions
and XML schema for the entire actions subelement of the metadata. In turn, policy
writers can select from among the available actions of the available handlers and construct
application policy metadata accordingly.
3.6 Toward a Model for D3P Application Design
In this section, we present a more abstract system model of D3P concepts. Our discussion
to this point has been couched in terms of the publish/subscribe paradigm. By abstract-
ing from those implementation details, we show that applications can be designed using
D3P principles without being dependent on any particular messaging strategy. Figure 11
summarizes the model design.
3.6.1 Model Objects
In the D3P model, computations are carried out at hosts. These computations are encapsu-
lated in tasks, an arbitrary number of which may execute at any host. Tasks communicate
2Other implementations of Overwatch might choose to forward such requests to other Overwatch instances
in the hopes of locating a suitable registered handler.
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Figure 11: Illustration of the D3P system model.
with each other over links, which are unidirectional and asynchronous. Information trans-
mitted over each link has a type, and each link carries information of exactly one type.
It is possible for a task to discover the structure of any unknown type by contacting a
type-server. Any task may introduce a new type at any time.
Other computations can be associated with links; such computations are called handlers.
A handler is logically associated with a task at either endpoint of a link (i.e., at a host)
and is executed when a task sends or receives data. Handlers accept input and may or may
not produce output. They have access to the type information of the link with which they
are associated, and can perform stateful, content-aware actions based on the information in
the link. Handlers always accept an input type (the type of their link), and always produce
a boolean value. They may also produce an output type (potentially any type in the type
universe). Handlers also may change their input data. We say that handlers are themselves
typed; this type is actually a 2-tuple (I,O), where I is the input type to the handler and O
is the output type (or nil if there is no output type).
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Handlers can differ in the way they treat their input data and produce output data.
These differences are reflected in the three classes of handlers: inspectors, adorners, and
morphers. Inspectors accept a specific data type as input and produce only a boolean result.
These handlers may perform some type of reflection on the type or computation using the
data itself to determine the result value. For example, the handler could be an expression of
criteria that the input type or data must satisfy. Or, an input type that contains an array
of floats might be vetted by a handler that computes the arithmetic mean of the values
in the array and compares it against a given amount. Adorners produce an output type
— the same as the input type. However, Adorners are so named because they may make
changes in their input data. Revisiting the Inspector example above, an Adorner could not
only compute the average of a subset of input data, but also store it in the output data for
transmission along the link (assuming, of course, that the Adorner returns a true value).
Morphers add the ability to produce an output type that is different from the input type.
They provide the ability to perform type specialization or narrowing based on input type


































Figure 12: Inspectors, Adorners, and Morphers take different actions on input and output
types.
If multiple handlers are associated with a link, they execute serially in the order of their
time of installation. When installing a second handler, the input type of the new handler
must be the output type of the existing handler. A set of handlers at a link endpoint is
called a handler graph, and is a directed acyclic graph with a distinguished single head
handler and a distinguished single tail handler. Handler graphs, as with single handlers,
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have a type which is expressed as a tuple. A handler graph type tuple consists of the input
type of the head handler and the output type (or nil) of the tail handler. The boolean
result value of the graph is the value provided by the tail handler.
An important property of links with installed handlers is that the data is only forwarded
to the destination endpoint of the link if the handler returns true. If the return value is
false, the data is discarded. For handler graphs, their default organization is a set of
logical expressions across the graph. By default, each of these is a logical AND across the
results of each path in the graph from the head to the tail. In this mode, for each path
through the handler graph, the boolean return value from each handler must be true in
order for the remaining handlers in the path to execute. If each handler in a path returns
true, and the tail handler executes and returns true, data is forwarded across the link. For
purposes of determining whether or not data is forwarded, the graph is treated as a “black
box”. The complete boolean expression represented by the “black box” of the handler graph
can be modified by inserting different boolean and grouping operators after the graph is
constructed.
Complex functionality can be encoded and manipulated using graphs of connected han-
dlers. In such graphs, data is projected from a handler into one or more downstream
handlers. Data can traverse the graph along multiple paths according to application re-
quirements. Any symmetric data manipulation task (such as encryption/decryption) can
be modeled in D3P as the installation of matched pairs of handler graphs at appropriate
link endpoints. More advanced strategies can include “slicing” data so that particular pieces
can execute at tasks with specialized abilities (for instance, special hardware support for
rendering images being shipped as part of an event). Several research efforts are directed at
working with such graphs. One such is the Active Streams programming model [25], which
provides guidelines for defining and manipulating diverse handler (streamlet in that context)
structures. Active Streams supports simple point-to-point operations as well as complicated





Figure 13: Handlers can be combined in graphs to achieve a series of effects.
3.6.2 Capabilities
All D3P objects are manipulated through a single mechanism: capabilities. Generally, a
capability combines an unforgeable reference to an object with an expression of the set of
permitted operations for that object. D3P capabilities are created upon request by a trusted
model object called Overwatch. Overwatch encapsulates policy decisions and manipulation,
handles the publication and updates of capability revocation lists, and removes the necessity
of distributing trusted components throughout the model. Capabilities contain references
both to the object they name and to the owner of the capability; both references are
necessary to execute operations in the protection model. All model operations require
a capability with appropriate rights. Construction of a link requires a special capability
granted by ; installing a handler on a link requires a capability referencing the link that has
“install-handler” rights, as well as a capability for the handler that permits installation.
The “black box” view of a handler graph provided by D3P allows graphs to be manipu-
lated and reasoned about in the same manner as single handlers. A handler (or graph) and
the link to which it is attached can also be referred to as a compound object, using a single
capability. This property of D3P objects prevents an explosion of capability references. It
also makes possible the advance definition and packaging of interesting functionality.
As mentioned earlier, links are strongly typed. The type system is also manipulated
through the use of capabilities. In order to install a handler that refers to a particular type,
a capability for that type must be presented. If a Morpher is being used to perform type
conversion, capabilities for both the input and output types are necessary.
The ability to “prepackage” links and handlers provides D3P with an important part of
its usefulness. Links can be predefined with handlers that implicitly convert types to those









... object ID and type ID
... cryptographic protection against forgery or replay
...rights specific to the object type
... general credential rights
..authenticated client/role name or ID
...event sink for revocations or other updates
...type−specific information
Figure 14: Capabilities in D3P can be viewed as having record structure.
basis, where each endpoint for a link is constructed with a customized Morpher based on
policy information obtained from Overwatch.
3.6.3 Type Definitions
Although a full type-theoretic treatment of D3P has not been completed, we present several
definitions here for clarity. There is a universe of types available in the model which we
denote Udata. These are the types which applications use to represent and manipulate
their data. It is actually more appropriate to say that there are two such universes, where
the second is Uprimitive and corresponds to the set of primitive or atomic types used for
composition. Although it might seem that Uprimitive ⊂ Udata, the D3P model exchanges
structured composite data and so the two sets of types are disjoint. Udata is defined by the
set S of type-servers available to the application. Any type-server in S may contribute a
type to Udata, and any application may use any type T ∈ Udata.
Handlers operate on types in Udata. As specified above, handlers themselves have types,
which are drawn from the universe Uhandler. The members of Uhandler are defined as T1 → T2,
T1 ∈ Udata, T2 ∈ Udata ∪ Uprimitive. D3P defines three types of handlers in Uhandler. For a
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handler H,
• H is an Inspector iffH : T1 → boolean;
• H is an Adorner iffH : T1 → T1; and
• H is a Morpher iffH : T1 → T2, T2 ∈ Udata.
3.6.4 Degrees of Freedom
One measure of the usability of middleware is the number and type of restrictions placed
on application designers and developers. We note that several degrees of freedom are pre-
served by the D3P model. First, D3P requires only a type system to support inspection
of data or differentiate between multiple accesses to a single type. D3P is independent of
knowledge of roles, principals, or other high-level security modeling concepts. Second, the
only constraints on how handlers are expressed are the presence of a type system and the
requirement to produce a boolean output. This allows a wide range of possible expres-
sions for computations. Handlers can run the gamut from rule-checking engines such as are
used for network firewalls to architecture-specific, dynamically-loaded binary code objects.
Third, although handlers are logically associated with link endpoints (i.e., with sending or
receiving tasks), D3P does not prevent implementations from decoupling handler execution
and application-level endpoints. This property can be very useful in cases where specialized
hardware is available at remote hosts or when network conditions require alternate data
routing strategies. Finally, D3P allows arbitrarily complex structures of handlers to be
defined and modified according to application requirements. These structures can take the
form of simple chains, where output from each handler is routed to the next in a serial
manner. They can also be complex graphs representing application workflow, hardware, or
network characteristics.
3.7 Model vs. Implementation
The abstractions provided by the D3P model are designed to allow implementations whose
implementation goals may be different from each other. The reference implementation of
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D3P aims to provide a basic testbed and proofs-of-concept. As such, its design makes
compromises with respect to the types of threats against which it protects applications.
Capabilities in the model are conceptually much closer to memory-guaranteed objects
such as found in Hydra. They are portable, unforgeable and non-reproducible. This al-
lows the model to make guarantees that the reference implementation cannot, and raises
questions in the reference implementation that the model does not currently address. For
instance, unchecked capability delegation is certainly possible in the implementation, since
capabilities are implemented as user-space objects. The model restricts delegation to those
capabilities with appropriate rights set. Implementation objects are simply memory regions
that can be copied into other regions. The implementation does guard against moving ca-
pability information out of process, by including process and thread IDs in the capability
attribute list and checking them at subscription time. A D3P application could make ar-
bitrary copies of its own capabilities and use them interchangeably, possibly resulting in
denial-of-service attacks (if sink subscriptions are doubled) or data stream corruption (if
each event in an image stream were published twice, for example).
Capability revocation in the model also provides stricter guarantees than in the im-
plementation. Revocations in the model happen directly between Overwatch and the ca-
pabilities involved; rights are changed directly and atomically, without any implied com-
munication or action on behalf of an owning task, and the changes detected on the next
use of the capability. Since D3P/ECho capabilities are C-language objects, they cannot
themselves receive revocation notices. Since Overwatch is a separate user-space process,
it cannot directly change the rights in a capability affected by revocation. A revocation
event sink and capability revocation queue are implemented per process. Performing their
processing may result in time lapses between the policy change that results in revocation
and a change in application behavior resulting from the attempt to use a no-longer-valid
capability. Such time lapses might possibly disclose unauthorized data, allow unauthorized
or incorrect channel derivations, or otherwise compromise a D3P system.
Code isolation in the D3P model is not addressed completely. It is assumed that Over-
watch will supply only handlers that are trusted to install and execute correctly. This
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allows tasks in the D3P model to disregard the dangers of incorporating “foreign” code into
their execution loops, guaranteeing freedom from one half of the mutual suspicion problem.
The converse problem, regarding the safety of handler code or data from modification by
the task, is not considered. In the implementation, handlers run in the user space of the
application, and their data and code spaces may be inspected or modified. The converse
problem also exists, as handler code has free access to the data space of the application.
This gives rise to problems with data confidentiality and code safety. The implementation
does guarantee that a particular handler will be verified as genuine before channel derivation
occurs. Future research [67] is aimed at providing improved code isolation and sanitization
guarantees in an efficient implementation.
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CHAPTER 4
INFRASTRUCTURE COMPONENTS FOR DATA
PROTECTION
There are several infrastructure components required in order for D3P to provide its services.
In this chapter, we describe these components and how they contribute to the overall D3P
picture.
4.1 Data Type Services
The modern distributed applications targeted by D3P exchange structured data that dig-
itally describes mechanical parts or equipment under design, graphical objects being dis-
played, or scientific data representing atmospheric volumes and chemical concentrations.
The infrastructure used by D3P provides efficient wire formats for that structured data
through the use of PBIO [53]. It also separates metadata specification from data structure
definition via the XMIT toolkit [170]. For D3P, this is important because XML-based type
specifications are heavily used in Overwatch policy statements (in order to promote ease
and flexibility of of type definition). These packages are described in the following sections.
4.1.1 PBIO
PBIO (Portable Binary Input/Output) is a binary-format message definition and manip-
ulation library. By using PBIO, distributed applications can use binary data in its native
forms, by providing support that enables participating components to share metadata about
data structure and layout. PBIO’s native data representation (NDR) is a “receiver makes it
right” approach, where the sender transmits the data in its own native data format, and it
is up to the receiver to perform any necessary conversion. Any translation on the receiver’s
side uses custom routines created through dynamic code generation (DCG). By thus elim-
inating compile- or design-time rigidly defined common wire formats, components’ data
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exchanges can be updated whenever and wherever needed. In addition, PBIO avoids the up
and down translations required by approaches like XDR. Furthermore, when sender and re-
ceiver use the same native data representation, such as in exchanges between homogeneous
architectures, this approach allows received data to be used directly from the message buffer,
thereby eliminating high copy overheads [138, 167]. When sender’s and receiver’s formats
differ, NDR’s DCG-based conversions have efficiency similar to that of systems that rely on
a priori agreements to make use of compile- or link-time stub generation. However, because
NDR’s conversion routines are dynamically generated at data-exchange initialization, our
approach offers considerably greater flexibility. The metadata required to implement this
approach jointly with the runtime flexibility afforded by DCG allow D3P to offer XML or
object-system levels of plug-and-play communication without compromising performance.
Stated more explicitly, explicit metadata for type definition (defining the layout, and in
certain cases sizes, of items within a data structure) allows very precise and targeted mar-
shaling actions to and from wire formats. While this level of metadata is “hard-coded” and
unresponsive to application changes under other middleware architectures, D3P provides
methods to separate the explicit definition of type metadata from efficient implementation
of the formatting decisions based on that metadata. These methods are encapsulated in
the XMIT toolkit described next.
4.1.2 XMIT
An important property of mechanisms for structured data exchange is the degree to which
they permit the independent evolution of data definitions, thereby enabling applications
to communicate via enhanced data structures. This is difficult when using communication
mechanisms like RPC or CORBA’s remote object invocations that perform data definition
in a programmatic fashion. Embedding metadata into communication or application code
may result in good performance, but substantial costs arise when applications evolve, as
changes in metadata require consequent modification and recompilation of the codes using
such metadata. In addition, this approach limits the utility of metadata; while most systems
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can be usefully abstracted by the structure of the data they exchange, the level of expres-
siveness of commonly used programming languages such as C is a severe handicap. Finally,
embedding metadata also ‘hides’ it from exactly the non-programmer end users to whom it
is typically most useful: the engineers designing parts, the scientists studying atmospheric
phenomena, and others, who share data in their distributed collaborative workspaces.
Our research has been predicated on the belief that open metadata systems will become
increasingly important and useful, especially for non-programmers using distributed com-
putations that share substantial amounts of data. This belief is validated in part by the
increasing popularity of metadata standards like XML [2]. However, the success of open
metadata systems requires that their use does not unreasonably degrade the performance
of applications that use them. Consequently, our work seeks to reconcile openness and
performance.
4.1.2.1 Efficient Binary Transmission of Structured Data
Our approach addresses interoperability at levels ’below’ those of RPC or CORBA, but
with functionality exceeding that of common data exchange formats like XDR. Specifically,
we are concerned with the efficient movement of the data structures that are defined at the
’system’ level of distributed applications and middleware, typically using implementation
languages like C. Such structured data usually resides in main memory, and when moved
across heterogeneous machines, issues including byte-order, field alignment, and atomic type
representation must be addressed.
Furthermore, at this level, data transmission in binary format is critical, due to the
high communication bandwidths or low transmission latencies required, or because of the
undue processing loads that would be imposed on systems if they were forced to transform
information from end user readable formats, like text, to binary formats, for instance.
Sample applications requiring binary data transmission include high performance codes
moving scientific or engineering data and wide-area transfers of operational data, where
scalability to many information clients and sources implies the need to reduce per-client
or per-source processing and transmission requirements. They also include server-based
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applications in which single servers must provide information to large numbers of clients.
4.1.2.2 Efficient and ‘Open’ Specification of Data Structure
In CORBA, data structures are defined using IDL specifications. In RPC, procedure pa-
rameters are characterized by their types specified within ‘interface module’ descriptions.
Openness in metadata definition implies that data structure specifications are not linked to
certain transmission mechanisms, such as RPC, or specific protocols, such as those used in
the transmission of manufacturing, parts, or design information in the automobile industry,
or as those used by specific data storage facilities (e.g., database query languages). Instead,
openness requires that data structure may be specified independently of data transmission
and use, with translations of such structure to the efficient lower-level representations used
for data transmission or manipulation ‘hidden’ from end users.
We have developed a novel approach to open, high-performance systems. Our approach
decomposes the transfer process for structured data, which results in efficient, binary (not
text-based) low-level encodings of data, while also maintaining open user-readable and
-comprehensible data structure definitions. We described our implementation of this ap-
proach, the XML metadata Integration Toolkit (XMIT), a tool which provides flexible
metadata definition using XML, while also supporting high-performance, binary data trans-
mission. We demonstrated that XMIT provides performance comparable to that of binary
data transmission, by using runtime methods of establishing structured data exchange.
Small ‘startup’ overheads are incurred only during ‘connection establishment’, that is, each
time an XMIT-based exchange is initiated and/or the structure of the data exchanged is
modified.
4.1.2.3 Open Metadata Specification In A D3P Infrastructure
D3P leverages the decoupling of data definition provided by XMIT in its specification of
handler metadata. As presented in Chapter 3, metadata statements for handlers contain a
specification of the data types used for input and output. This specification may consist
of a string naming the type, in which case an internal lookup table of predefined type
definitions is used. For additional flexibility, XMIT-style type definitions can be used. In
50
such cases, the XMIT toolkit is used to dynamically construct a type definition for use by a
D3P application. The reference D3P implementation uses the PBIO library to define data
structure, but other implementations of the Overwatch module may wish to use other wire-
format definitions. Using XMIT, D3P applications can operate with Overwatch modules
using any wire-format definition scheme.
4.2 Directory Services
D3P applies to a wide variety of distributed applications, particularly including loosely
coupled applications crossing physical and organizational boundaries. Advances in commu-
nication technologies and the proliferation of computing devices have made this possible;
two such types of infrastructures are pervasive computing environments [55, 74] and compu-
tational grids [160, 75, 58]. An important component of D3P, therefore, is an infrastructure
layer that allows distributed resources and services to be pooled and managed as though
they were locally available. A key element of such a layer is a directory service that provides
information about different objects in the environment, such as resources and people, to
applications and their users. Well-known examples of such services are the Metacomputing
Directory Service (MDS) [57] for Globus-based environments, and the Intentional Nam-
ing System (INS) [7] for applications developed in the Oxygen [114] pervasive computing
project. Directory services in both types of environments must support sophisticated object
descriptions and query patterns, operate in highly dynamic environments, and scale to an
increasingly large number of objects and users.
Traditional directory services have been designed for fairly static environments, where
updates are rare (DNS [117], LDAP [176], and X.500 [132]). Recent work has addressed the
issues of expressiveness of their object descriptions and query languages (through attribute-
value hierarchies [7], for example) and considered their scalability (through domain-based
partitioning or hierarchical organization [7, 42, 43, 150]). However, these directory services
rely on traditional “inactive” interfaces, where clients interested in the values of certain
objects’ attributes must explicitly request such information from the server. Czajkowski et
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al. [42] demonstrate that it is feasible to satisfy widely different information service require-
ments with a single, consistent framework. Their example applications range from tradi-
tional service discovery with relatively static mappings to superschedulers and application
adaptation monitors, where objects and their attributes change at fast and unpredictable
rates and fresh information is crucial to clients’ functionality. In such scenarios, clients in
need of up-to-date information have no alternative but to query servers at rates that (at
least) match those at which changes occur.
We have previously described how an exclusively inactive interface to directory services
can hinder server scalability and indirectly affect the behavior of potential applications [149].
In [24], we propose extensions of directory services’ interfaces with a proactive mode by
which clients can express their interest in, and be notified of, changes in the environment.
A potential drawback of proactivity is the clients’ loss of control of the frequency and type
of notifications. To address this, we propose the client-specific customization of notification
channels through simple functions that are shipped and efficiently executed at the notifica-
tions’ sources. In this section, we will describe the Proactive Directory Service and how it
contributes to the D3P infrastructure.
4.2.1 Proactivity in Directory Services
Proactivity is a well-established system design technique with applications ranging from
device/kernel communication to component-based software integration. The use of proac-
tivity in directory services has some precedents in DNS NOTIFY [161] for zone change
notification, the Ninja Secure Directory Service (SDS) [43] for service announcement, and
the “persistent search” extension to LDAP proposed by Smith et al. [148].
Our extension of directory service interfaces with proactivity has three parts: (1) we
associate a channel for change notification with each object managed by the directory
service, through these channels clients can become aware of changes to their objects of
interest; (2) we support the customization of notification channels through client-specific
filters, which are then used by the server to determine whether to send a given update; and









































Figure 15: Owners register entities with the directory. Clients poll the directory for
specific entities or types of entities. Clients can register to receive notifications of entity
changes (from the directory (1) or the entity’s owner (2)). Clients customize notification
channels through filters placed at the notification sources.
the handling of client failures. We now discuss each of these ideas in more detail.
Changes to an object managed by the directory service are reported to registered clients
over the object’s associated notification channel. Multiple clients can be registered with
each notification channel and, conversely, a single client can be registered with multiple
notification channels. Examples of types of events include the creation or removal of an
entry or changes to (the attributes of) an existing entry in the directory.
An implicit attribute of passive, pull-based interfaces is control: clients are in control of
the frequency and type of the messages exchanged with the directory service. Proactivity
allows clients to trade control for performance, as message traffic is (only) generated when
updates occur. After registration, however, clients are at the mercy of the service and can
find themselves swamped with unforeseen (and potentially unwanted) updated messages.
At first glance, providing a filter at the client to discard the unwanted updates might
seem enough. Although this does allow the application to ignore such updates, the corre-
sponding messages are still sent across the network, increasing the load on the server, the
network, and the client. Providing a single interface at the server to control proactive traffic
is also insufficient, as different clients interested in changes may have different criteria for
discarding update messages.
A better approach allows client-specific customization of the update channel. To cus-
tomize a channel, a client provides a specification (in the form of a function) of “relevant”
events. The server then uses these specifications, on a per-client basis, to determine whether
53
to send a given update.
A critical issue, then, is the nature of the functions specifying clients’ interest. Such
functions could be expressed in a restricted filter language [27, 151] or in a general inter-
preted language such as Tcl/Tk [125] or Java [107]. A third approach, and the one adopted
in PDS, is to allow specifications in a general (procedural) language, but to utilize dynamic
code generation to create a native version of the functions at the notification source.
To avoid the unnecessary cost of pushing updates to clients who have failed (or termi-
nated normally without unbinding) we advocate the use of leasing for registrations with
notification channels. A lease, in this context, represents a period of time during which the
request for change notification is active 1. Clients can request a lease period, but the actual
length of it is determined by the directory service. In addition, clients holding a lease can
choose to cancel it or request its renewal.
4.2.2 Proactive Directory Service in a D3P Infrastructure
PDS is used by the Overwatch module to stay aware of policy changes. This is primarily
useful in determining which conditions in policy statements might be applicable at any given
time. Policy metadata includes a PDS server and namespace reference, which Overwatch
uses to subscribe to an update channel. When context or environment information changes,
Overwatch is notified by PDS and updates its internal condition table appropriately. This
enables Overwatch to respond dynamically to application state changes.
A key issue in context changes, and one well-studied in capability systems, is that of
capability revocation. What should be done when the conditions in force for the creation of
a capability at time T no longer obtain at time T + 2 minutes? Recall that the definition
of a capability is a reference to an object combined with rights to that object. Changes
in conditions imply changes in the rights of the capability, to the extreme of rendering the
capability entirely invalid. Obviously, new requests for capabilities can be handled in light
of the changed execution conditions, but previously issued ones must be modified. The
current implementation of D3P handles this by maintaining a revocation ECho channel
1Leasing also simplifies the handling of directory server failures, since such failures are perceived by clients
of the service’s proactive interface as lease cancellations.
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to which all D3P applications implicitly subscribe. When revocations occur, an event is
pushed to this channel. The EControlContext object used by the application receives this
event and determines which ECho capability must be modified. On the next use of the
revoked ECho capability (attempt to subscribe to a channel as source or sink, attempt to
derive a channel from an existing one, submission of data as a source or receipt of data as
a sink), the capability’s now-updated rights are checked and the appropriate action taken.
In the most common case, where data is received by an application acting as a sink, the
application event handler is not called and the application is un-subscribed from the ECho
channel.
In this manner, an application context change monitored through PDS results in the
dynamic adjustment of application access to data and/or functionality.
4.2.3 Broker Services
When starting, distributed applications must be able to discover the state of their peer
network. In particular, applications sharing communication channels need to find which
channels are already established and can be used and which remain to be created. We em-
ploy a group server to coordinate these activities. Other distributed systems have similar
components - brokers in CORBA [1] or the JINI [116] architecture, for example. Appli-
cations contact the group server to find out which communication channel they should be
using. If no such channel exists, the application is free to create a channel and register it
with the group server.
4.3 Summary
The integration of the infrastructure components described in this chapter into the D3P
programming model provides novel benefits to applications.
Extension of the D3P data protection model into the PBIO data definition library
provides users with a high-performance binary data-formatting package whose metadata
system is access-controlled. This control is exercised by the Overwatch policy module,
using policy information derived from the same statements as are used to describe data
stream and handler policy.
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D3P’s use of the XMIT metadata toolkit allows flexible use of XML Schema data types
to be used in policy statements. Important to note here is that XMIT type specifications can
be used to define new types, with policy information associated directly and immediately
instead of being separated or coded into application logic.
D3P leverages the proactive abilities of the Proactive Directory service in order to receive
dynamic notice of application policy updates. As application policies or execution condi-
tions change, Overwatch modules on affected hosts can become aware of those changes and
implement needed revocation or stream reassignment actions. Moreover, Overwatch be-
comes aware of these changes as an event consumer, without the need for constant polling.
This also allows applications to define specifically what kinds of context updates they wish
to implement.
Each of these infrastructure pieces is implicitly part of the trusted computing base of
D3P applications. Further research into D3P concepts will explore how to reduce the size




SUPPORTING AUDIT AND CONFIGURATION
CONTROL USING D3P
D3P is designed to provide data protection and manipulation functionality. Its design stems
from the idea that protection actions are better taken earlier rather than later. However,
the mechanism used to implement D3P also allows the construction of systems which report
on all adaptations and extensions, as opposed to ensuring that only the correct ones occur.
While this approach is less secure, it is also easier to achieve. More importantly, the
information flow created from reporting such actions can be a valuable resource.
The issues addressed in this dissertation are rooted in recent research trends toward
large-scale, component-based distributed systems that are dynamically configurable or ex-
tensible in response to changing execution environments or end-user needs. Regardless of
whether these configuration changes happen automatically through predefined adaptation
or self-management methods or in response to explicit user interaction, they can jeopardize
the integrity of application components. Moreover, they can cause unexpected effects in
system performance or even lead to disputes about middleware or application providers?
responsibilities for failures experienced by end users. This chapter introduces Reverb, a set
of middleware abstractions and mechanisms derived from core D3P concepts. Reverb can
be used to (1) audit configuration actions, (2) impose controls on permissible actions, and
(3) control which principals are permitted to carry out configurations. We have integrated
Reverb into the same middleware used in the high performance domain as we have used for
D3P. The intent of this integration is to not only demonstrate its viability and utility, but
also to show that Reverb-based configuration control has little effect on the performance of
the distributed applications or middleware that use it.
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5.1 Reverb Background
Industry efforts like IBM’s autonomic computing [91] or HP’s adaptive enterprise [83] ini-
tiatives are concrete demonstrations of the increasing importance of dynamically managing,
configuring, and adapting distributed applications. New functionality being developed in
these contexts and in ongoing basic research, and being integrated into distributed appli-
cations or systems includes self-repair in response to failures, resource awareness to better
match application behavior to available platform or network resources, and similar methods.
Supporting technologies that are making it ever easier to dynamically configure distributed
systems include new middleware and system techniques like code injection, dynamic code
generation, and runtime system extension.
The Reverb abstractions and their middleware realization described in this chapter ad-
dress several problems shared by all adaptive systems: (1) how to audit or track dynamic
configuration actions, (2) how to impose controls on permissible actions, and (3) how to
control which principals are permitted to initiate and carry out configuration actions. With
this functionality, Reverb addresses important needs of future self-* systems. Runtime code
injection, for instance, can lead to problems when applications written with complex middle-
ware infrastructures like Websphere or JBoss fail: should support personnel be responsible
for fixing issues due to dynamically injected code, for instance? And, which company’s
support personnel should be responsible? Similarly, while it is already well-established
that runtime system maintenance or upgrade should be done only by certain, responsible
parties, how can we extend suitable controls on less radical runtime updates, e.g., those
implied by shipping a new class structure to an application server in a J2EE infrastructure?
Finally, for complex system infrastructures or applications, surely, it should not be the case
that everyone can ship such classes to whoever needs to use them? Reverb addresses basic
questions like those raised above, by coupling runtime auditing of configuration changes
with fine-grain controls on what is being audited and on the set of configuration changes
certain principals are permitted to make. Auditing and control are integrated into the
middleware or the system mechanisms that are used to carry out configuration changes,
where Reverb views all such changes as operations applied to the entities being configured.
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Fine-grain constraints may be specified and enforced as to which particular changes are
audited – differential auditing – and then, as to which principals are permitted to carry out
which configuration operations on which entities, termed differential change control. Fur-
ther, Reverb makes such operator/entity associations entirely dynamic, so that distributed
applications can be differentially audited and/or controlled only when desired or needed by
end users. This permits developers to focus Reverb on those application components or
behaviors currently of most interest to them. Finally, by implementing differential audit
checks and controls with dynamically generated binary codes, Reverb performance effects
are felt only when Reverb is currently being used, thereby accommodating the high perfor-
mance or more generally, highly resource-constrained applications and systems addressed
by our research.
The Reverb implementation also comprises tools useful for developers and end users.
Remote code repository, directory, and storage mechanisms may be easily associated with
differential auditing or control runtime functionality. An XML-binary conversion tool may
be used to convert XML-based audit and control policy specifications to efficient binary
codes installed in applications or added to code repositories. Directory support is written
to permit principals to change as and when necessary [24], and audit codes may be dynam-
ically bound to additional functionality that produces audit logs for postmortem analysis
of desired vs. observed configuration changes.
The Reverb approach to configuration forensics addresses explicitly executed configu-
ration actions like runtime code injection, kernel extension, etc. It may detect changes
caused by failures, implicitly, by comparing otherwise collected log information against Re-
verb forensic logs. However, it cannot prevent such changes, nor can it prevent changes
caused by attacks. In fact, attackers could compromise Reverb’s operations itself, thus
still requiring systems to use intrusion detection or similar techniques to notice or discover
attacks and/or compromised system components. A kernel-level implementation of Reverb
now underway to track runtime system extensions is less vulnerable than the middleware
realization described here, but there are many system-level attacks that can compromise its
operation.
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The applications addressed by Reverb are the complex distributed codes now being
widely deployed, in Internet-based systems [93], in pervasive environments, or in wide area
scientific collaboration. By tracking and then limiting and controlling the ways in which
principals can change such applications, we hope to make it easier for developers, support
personnel, or end users to differentiate appropriate from inappropriate changes, expected
from unexpected change events, and reasonable from unreasonable change actions. Another
outcome is the ability to establish a clear history of change events and to trace them back to
the principals that made them, thereby making it easier for developers or support personnel
to exploit developer skills. An interesting extension of Reverb is the provision of additional
functionality that would detect or perhaps, even react to interesting event correlations,
such as correlating actions resulting from specific user interactions with actions taken by
self-changing applications.
This chapter describes a realization of Reverb in high performance publish/subscribe
middleware used by data-intensive applications. The goals are to demonstrate the viability
and utility of Reverb and to show that its presence and use do not impact the performance
experienced by applications. Experimental results, presented in Chapter 6, show that when
not being used, Reverb functionality has marginal effects on the fast paths of data transport
and manipulation of high performance applications. This is in direct contrast to the costs
experienced by persistence support, for example, in middleware like JavaSpaces [60, 181].
When being used, Reverb auditing can be quite inexpensive, especially when auditing is
coupled with simple in-place analyses [80] to detect specific conditions or behaviors. As
stated earlier, such analyses are dynamically created as binary codes generated from XML-
based policy specifications. Audit logging overheads are proportional to the extent of in-
place audit analysis and the amounts of audit data produced by logs.
Our current research uses Reverb to monitor configuration changes in a high-performance,
large-data application and produce an audit trail that can be used for on-line or off-line
analysis. Monitored changes include the creation of communication links, subscription for
data, and the introduction of user-code into the data transmission path. We show that this
monitoring can be accomplished in a flexible and scalable manner, with performance costs
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amortized across application data exchanges and low run-time overheads. In this chapter,
Section 5.2 motivates and describes the Reverb approach to handling configuration changes
for distributed adaptive systems. Section 5.3 illustrates the effectiveness of Reverb in ad-
dressing configuration changes in the context of our experience with a sample adaptive
application.
5.2 The Reverb Subsystem
In this section, we present an overview of Reverb and how it provides facilities to address
system configuration changes.
5.2.1 Reverb Mechanisms
Reverb distributes information relating to configuration changes to interested (and option-
ally only to authorized) parties. Such configuration changes can include creation of a chan-
nel, subscription of a particular client to a channel as source or sink, and/or the introduction
of user- or system-supplied code into an application. While use of other configuration mech-
anisms (such as syslog [4]) requires an explicit call from the program, Reverb produces
information implicitly as a consequence of any configuration change.
This information is distributed as configuration events over a dedicated event chan-
nel (the RChannel). Reverb explores two novel extensions to this concept. First, Reverb
provides the ability to control access to this channel, basing access control decisions on
application-specific and system-wide policies. Second, Reverb allows per-user, differential
customization of the information transmitted in the configuration channel. Such customiza-
tions do not require any intervention on the part of the middleware, but instead are accom-
plished implicitly as part of user requests for channel access.
The changes to a pub-sub application that Reverb monitors are:
• Creation/deletion of a channel;
• Subscription to a channel as source or sink; and
• Incorporation of any user code.
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The basic mechanism of Reverb is simple. Reverb-enabled applications have a lazy-
instantiated, dedicated event channel embedded in the middleware layer (the RChannel).
Client applications can only subscribe to the RChannel as sinks; that is, the channel is a
one-way information conduit whose sole publisher is the middleware layer. The middleware
detects when any of the monitored configuration changes occur and publishes an event to
the RChannel The structure of the configuration events is available through the ECho API.
The destination(s) of the configuration updates is unknown, as in all pub-sub systems.
If no sinks on the RChannel exist, no communication is performed and the update is essen-
tially a no-op. Any application may subscribe to the RChannel and process the resulting
configuration updates; processes might write them to a log file, display them on a console
or “bridge” them to other logging facilities such as syslog.
In many cases, it is desirable to control the dissemination of configuration information.
Situations where configuration changes must be verified in real-time or offline require that
only authorized users have access to the RChannel.
Reverb applications operate using the D3P extensions to ECho, and so must obtain
capabilities to create channels, to subscribe to channels as sources or sinks, or to incorporate
user code. This provides the Reverb subsystem with two distinct opportunities to report
on configuration changes - when access is requested for a particular middleware object
(for example, requesting a capability which allows subscription to a channel), and when
that access is actually exercised (the execution of the subscription operation using that
capability).
5.2.2 Applying Reverb With Checked Access
Should information concerning system configuration actions be available to all/any users?
The question is difficult to answer generally. Some applications will want to advertise their
current state for the convenience of users, which could be accomplished by monitoring con-
figuration changes. Others may want to conceal any user-provided functionality to protect
proprietary interests or reduce outside vulnerability. A flexible answer to this question of
policy is desirable.
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Reverb, through its interaction with the Overwatch, provides a flexible mechanism for
satisfying varied policy requirements. Applications provide policy statements (as XML
documents) to the Overwatch, which uses them to decide on access requests. Consider
an application whose operators wish its configuration changes logged to a file, but not
displayed in any other way. The application would provide an XML policy statement to the
Overwatch stating that only programs with a particular authentication token can subscribe
to its RChannel. A legitimate logger program, possessing the correct authentication token,
would then provide it to the Overwatch as part of its request to subscribe to the RChannel.
5.2.3 Customizing the RChannel
A commonly cited [25] drawback to using pub-sub architectures is the lack of control over
communication suffered by the client. In the Reverb context, applications subscribing to an
RChannel might find themselves spending CPU cycles and network bandwidth information
they do not need or want. We address this problem through client-specific customization of
pub-sub systems. More fully described elsewhere [52], client-specific customization allows
subscribers to define filter functions that are dynamically compiled and executed at the
publisher.
Reverb extends the notion of client-specific customization in the following way. Con-
sider a large scientific application where one set of users is interested in the installation
of any system extensions that provide downsampling access to color image streams but,
as a matter of application policy, are not allowed to learn of other system configuration
changes. Reverb can provide access to the RChannel that filters out all but the desired
configuration information. Recall that the protected mode of ECho forces all operations
to be performed using capabilities obtained from the Overwatch. Overwatch incorporates
application policy in order to make decisions about what kind of channel access to grant
and what data transformations to install as a precondition of access for particular users. In
this example, the application policy statement to Overwatch identifies a certain subset of
users that require this customized access and supplies metadata for a filter that performs
the customization. When one of these users requests access to the RChannel, Overwatch
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installs the filter on the RChannel, which in ECho creates a new, customized RChannel.
Overwatch then answers the user request with a capability for the customized RChannel
that can be used to subscribe as an event sink.
5.2.4 Supporting Infrastructure
As described in 4, certain pieces of supporting infrastructure are necessary in order for D3P
facilities like Reverb to function. We describe Reverb’s impact on this infrastructure here.
• Code repository. A filter used to customize the RChannel is user- or system- specified
code. This code is not necessarily incorporated into an application. Reverb can
dynamically compile user-provided code for a filter, providing maximum flexibility
and “user-in-the-loop” behavior. In cases where third-parties provide shared-library
filter support, a code repository provides architecture-specific access to filter code.
Integrity of binary-format filters is assured through the use of message digests.
• Directory service. Reverb makes use of the Proactive Directory Service (PDS) for two
reasons. First, distributed access to an RChannel implies the need for global naming
support and coordination of access to the global namespace. Second, PDS supports
rights revocation services through its customizable proactive mode.
• Group broker. It would be inefficient in terms of time and resources to perform re-
peated identical customizations on the RChannel for different subscribers. To avoid
this, the Overwatch performs broker function. When a subscriber’s access to the
RChannel has been determined, Overwatch first checks to see if any compatible cus-
tomizations of the RChannel already exist. If so, the subscriber is assigned to the
already-existing customized RChannel.
5.3 Application Experience
We illustrate the use and functionality of Reverb by describing how a wide-area distributed
application takes advantage of Reverb’s abilities. The application we use comes from the
pervasive computing domain. Active Video Streams (AVS) is introduced in Chapter 2.1
and is described in more detail here.
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5.3.1 Active Video Streams
We created Active Video Streams (AVS) to explore issues with deploying adaptive, high-
performance data-streaming services in a distributed environment. By adaptive, we mean
the ability of the application to react to changes in environmental conditions (network
congestion, for example) or application-specific considerations (such as input from a human
user). We also seek to provide such adaptive behavior at little or no cost in terms of run-
time communication latency, bandwidth consumption, or more complicated costs associated
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installation of image filters
Figure 16: The Active Video Streams (AVS) applications consists of a camera driven by
a separate host machine. This host machine serves as a video source and transmits images
from the camera over a wireless communication link to a Java player application. The player
application incorporates a control interface which can install filters on the event channel
connecting the two hosts.
AVS consists of two components which communicate using the ECho middleware. The
first component is a webcam and associated driver that sends images along the communi-
cations link. An off-the-shelf webcam is used for this purpose, connected to a computer
through a standard USB port. Images recorded from the camera are converted to PPM im-
ages and marshaled using the PBIO binary encoding package. Each data packet represents
one frame from the video camera. The encoded data packets are then sent along an ECho
event channel to the receiver component.
At the receiving end of the event channel, the other AVS component decodes the data
from its wire-format representation using PBIO. AVS has two modules that can fill the
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role of the receiver component. One is a simple listener that writes frames to the local file
system as they are received. The other is a Java-based viewer (the player) that provides
the user with an interface on which each successive frame is shown. By using the viewer
interface, the user effectively can see the real-time view picked up by the webcam.
An example of the type of application modification carried out in AVS is the follow-
ing. The default configuration for the webcam is to send RGB images. Suppose that a
particular user wishes to instead see greyscale images from this webcam. This could be
due to network conditions, where the 66% reduction in data being transferred might well
improve performance. It is also possible that certain applications might better serve users
if the image stream could be converted to greyscale on demand. The stream modification
necessary to do the greyscale conversion is a piece of E-Code that performs a mathematical
transformation on each pixel of the color image to produce a greyscale image.
5.3.2 Configuration Change in AVS
The three types of configuration changes for which Reverb produces audit information
correspond to the following actions in AVS:
• A camera component publishes images captured from the camera;
• A remote viewer subscribes to an existing image feed;
• A remote viewer installs a filter to change the type of image received.
For an AVS camera component to publish images, an ECho event channel must be
created. The camera driver code must then subscribe to the newly created channel and
begin submission of events, in this case image frames. For a remote viewer to view images
produced by an AVS camera, it must subscribe to an existing image feed, i.e. the already
created event channel. For the user of a remote viewer decides to manipulate the image
for functionality or performance reasons, a filter must be installed on the event channel
(deriving a new channel). Each occurrence of one of these changes in the AVS application
is a significant event in the configuration of an AVS application instance. Reverb causes
configuration events to be generated by the middleware for each case (without explicit action
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by AVS or the user), and submitted to the RChannel. An interested party monitoring the
RChannel can then gain a clear picture of the configuration changes in a particular instance
of AVS.
We will illustrate this with a case where user code is injected into the AVS execution
loop, i.e. the installation of an image filter. The corresponding ECho API for this operation
is EChannel derive. This API requires a reference to the original event channel and a
reference to the filter code to be installed. As noted earlier, this filter code can either
be provided immediately, as a text string to be dynamically compiled, or as an indirect
reference to a shared object. During the EChannel derive call, the Reverb subsystem
notes the success or failure of the derivation attempt. Failure could occur due to an error
in the code causing a problem during dynamic compilation or due to inability to locate
an appropriate shared object for the machine architecture in use, among other reasons.
Assuming the Reverb subsystem is configured to log derivation events, an RChannel is
instantiated if need be. This involves creating an ECho event channel and subscribing as
a source (actions which are themselves logged by Reverb). The configuration event is then
submitted to the RChannel.
The configuration event contains a type indication (CREATION, SUBSCRIPTION, or DERIVATION)
and reflects whether or not the operation succeeded. An application/component identifier
can be provided to Reverb; if so, it is included in the configuration event and can be used to
uniquely identify the source of component messages. Finally, operation-specific information
(such as the code string used to derive a new ECho event channel and the channel identifier
of the source channel) is also included.
5.3.3 Access to the RChannel
From the subscriber point of view, the RChannel is just like any other ECho event channel.
ECho supports global identifiers for its event channels but has no namespace or discovery
infrastructure. AVS retrieves and publishes the global identifier for its RChannel in a
directory service with well-known contact points. Any application wishing to subscribe to
the RChannel can then retrieve this global identifier and subscribe normally.
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This situation changes if checked access is being performed through the Overwatch se-
curity module. In this case, the ECho middleware notifies Overwatch of the RChannel
identifier. Anyone wishing subscription or derivation access to the RChannel must pro-
vide appropriate authentication credentials to Overwatch. The nature and content of these
credentials can be specified by applications in a policy file. For instance, applications
may specify that username/password authentication against /etc/passwd is sufficient for
RChannel access, or instead that public-key certificates must be provided. AVS currently
identifies users through username/password pairs. The global identifier for the RChannel
is not provided directly in checked access mode either; a capability is issued to the re-
quester that can be used to subscribe to the RChannel through the checked access API of
ECho. This provides a protected interface to configuration events, one of Reverb’s notable
contributions.
5.3.4 Customization of the RChannel
For applications that undergo frequent configuration changes, a significant number of con-
figuration events may be generated. In the AVS context, this can occur when several users
introduce individual customizations into the event channel, each operation deriving a new
channel. Since the RChannel is a normal ECho event channel, it too may be customized by
the introduction of user code.
A basic example is of a monitoring application that is only interested in AVS derivation
events. Applications can provide a filter that inspects each event, checks its type field, and
discards it if the type field is not DERIVATION. Since the structure of configuration events
is available through the ECho interface definition, user code can be written to enforce any
desired filtering action. Also possible is synthesis, where a filter may compute data for its
own later use or to be provided to downstream parts of notification structures.
As with subscription, the situation changes in checked access mode. The convention for
derivation in ECho in checked access mode is to provide authentication credentials and a
reference to user code to ECho, which in turn provides them to Overwatch. A capability for
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a newly derived channel is then returned to the caller. More frequently, however, applica-
tions will define a priori what access to configuration information particular users (or user
classes) will have. This is dictated by the principle of least privilege, under which a user or
component of a system has access to the smallest subset of system information necessary for
its job. These policy definitions are made available to Overwatch and are used to respond
appropriately to RChannel access requests.
Significant here is that audit processing can be subdivided and customized, without
requiring intervention from the audit subscribers. Instead of a monolithic audit application
receiving and de-multiplexing all AVS configuration change events, multiple smaller appli-
cations are created. Each audit application receives unique authentication credentials, and
an AVS policy statement detailing which configuration events are accessible by which audit
subscriber is provided to Overwatch. For example, suppose that two audit information
subscribers exist for AVS, one to process information about channel creations and subscrip-
tions (CS) and the other to process derivation information (D). This is not an unreasonable
construction of an AVS application instance; an audit program which verifies that user-
supplied filters are installed in a predetermined order does not necessarily need to know
when subscriptions and unsubscriptions happen. When D requests access, Overwatch notes
its restriction from the policy statement. Overwatch then provides D with a capability that
refers to a pre-customized RChannel; that is, an RChannel that has already had a filter
applied to it. In this case, the filter is one that checks the configuration event type field
and only passes those events of type DERIVATION. D can only access RChannel information
through the capability; it cannot forge a new capability to “get around” the installed filter.
RChannel access for CS is provided similarly. In this way, audit components can be kept
more modular and their vulnerability is reduced. Similar checked access to the RChannel
can be implemented for audit code that synthesizes events.
5.3.5 Response to Changes
What do applications do with the information provided through an RChannel? Part of the
design philosophy of Reverb has been to separate these considerations from the RChannel
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mechanism. The question is mainly one of policy: what action should be taken in a partic-
ular circumstance? The Reverb approach to policy is to incorporate such decisions in the
Overwatch module, and to have applications provide corresponding policy statements when
they begin execution. In AVS, for example, if a customization is installed that corrupts
or otherwise disables an ECho channel, audit components can provide feedback to Over-
watch. Such policy updates might include disabling customization for a particular end user
or restricting the use of suspect customizations for all users. It seems natural to consider
the pub/sub paradigm as a method of managing such policy updates. Overwatch does not
currently support this type of adaptive policy management. However, our ongoing research
is considering how best to address such issues, and how to better shift the design space from
a “solid” policy/mechanism boundary into sets of cooperating components.
5.4 Reverb Summary
This chapter has described the design and implementation of Reverb, a product of a middle-
ware implementing D3P principles. Reverb is designed to support efficient, customizable,
and protected dissemination of configuration information for distributed, large-data appli-
cations.
Our implementation of Reverb illustrates the flexibility and possibilities of using D3P.
Developers may prefer a maximally preventive system, defining access control policies for
use by Overwatch and disallowing all other access. A completely permissive system with
detailed logging output is also possible; in this scenario, permissive policies at Overwatch
coupled with detailed Reverb auditing output give the desired result. Given appropriate
policy definitions, options in the design space between these two extremes can be explored;
for example, particular user groups may be subject to increased auditing while specific
applications may desire complete access control. These policy definitions are orthogonal
to each other, allowing application security administrators and functionality developers to
work independently.
In Chapter 6, we shown how Reverb utilizes the D3P performance philosophy: rich
functionality (in this case, detailed and customizable audit trails) for our target applications
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This chapter presents evaluation results that quantify the costs and benefits of the D3P
design approach. These results have been obtained by experimentation on the reference
implementation of D3P, which is a modification of a snapshot of the ECho and PBIO li-
braries. We first present a short discussion of the performance philosophy that drives the
design of D3P, along with a characterization of basic overheads incurred by the implemen-
tation. As the performance of ECho itself has been characterized elsewhere, we will confine
our discussion to the impact of the D3P modifications to ECho.
In Section 6.3, we demonstrate how our implementation of D3P scales along the dimen-
sions of number of subscribers and sizes of data. D3P is designed to support large user
populations as well as large data applications, so acceptable performance under increas-
ing subscriber loads and data sizes is critical. We also discuss measurements derived from
the Reverb audit facility of D3P. Reverb provides applications with a “lazy” alternative to
the D3P approach, and the performance of those applications during periods of frequent
configuration activity can be a factor in determining whether or not to use it.
In Section 6.4, we present an evaluation of the XMIT metadata tool. Much of the flexibil-
ity benefits of D3P depend on the ability to represent type information in a system-agnostic
manner, as D3P does with its XML Schema-derived method. We present experimental re-
sults that quantify the implications of representing type structures in this manner.
Section 6.5 demonstrates performance benefits available through the use of D3P. Us-
ing D3P, applications can meet functional and/or security requirements without sacrificing
efficiency. In some important and common cases, performance is actually improved over
alternative, requirement-preserving implementations.
The chapter closes with a summary of our evaluation results.
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6.1 Data Path vs. Control Path
The key insight to the performance benefits of D3P is the realization that many performance-
limiting operations in the applications happen in what can be termed the control path. In
the streaming data applications addressed by D3P, the control path encompasses stream
definition, changes to the type of data being streamed, or installation of handlers on the
stream. The amount of time taken to perform these operations is typically dominated by
the time taken during normal streaming. For example, consider the AVS application. A
user may view a stream of several thousand images, decide to install one of a set of handlers,
and then view another set of image frames. In this example, time spent receiving images
constitutes time spent in the data path of the application. The performance implications of
D3P are driven by the degree to which the time spent in the data path dominates the time
spent in the control path.
We now consider the control exerted by the D3P system. By definition, the actions
governed by D3P are in the control path of an application. Policy statements determine
whether users can subscribe to streams, whether they can install handlers, and which han-
dlers they can install. Once the subscription has been completed or a handler has been
installed, data transfer continues at rates largely unaffected by protection actions.
D3P does introduce some performance overhead into the data path for each event re-
ceived. The capability supplied by the user must be checked to see that its rights have not
been changed or revoked entirely. This involves computing a hash to verify capability in-
tegrity, checking a revocation flag and performing a bitmasking operation. These steps are
taken for each subscription held by a receiving process. However, they are only necessary
once per event for a sending process, no matter how many subscribers exist. This reduces
the ability of subscribers to perturb the performance of publishers.
6.2 Basic D3P Overhead
We first characterize the overhead of our D3P implementation in ECho, by measuring the
time taken to create basic ECho objects with and without D3P. For each middleware action,
we record the percentage increase in time required to complete the action. The following
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table presents representative results from these tests.





The primary attractiveness of the D3P mechanism is that these performance overheads
are not in the critical path of data transfer. In the reference implementation, for instance,
once access to the channel has been established or a handler installed, data transfer proceeds
at speeds limited only by the underlying middleware (ECho) or network. Even in those
situations where the mechanism does have a performance impact, that impact is minimal.
6.3 Scalability
In this series of experiments, we show that the addition of D3P functionality does not
impact the scalability of the ECho middleware. For each experimental scenario, we report
several metrics. Total send time is measured as the “wall-clock” time needed by the server
to send a set of events to an increasing number of clients. As the underlying event channel
middleware we use, ECho, is based on TCP, an event send involves a TCP write() to each
client. Real-time measurements in this section begin with the first event send and terminate
at the end of the last server-side write(). We measure a large enough sample size of events
that TCP buffering effects are negligible. Server load is expressed as the amount of user
and system time elapsed.
We have previously demonstrated [24] that ECho is linearly scalable with respect to the
number of subscribers and the amount of data transferred, even though it is essentially a
unicast architecture. Figure 17 depicts this result. Our insight into the design of D3P is
that this efficiency can be preserved through careful attention to the data transfer path.
We repeat our previous experiment using the D3P version of ECho. Results appear in
Figure 18. As expected, absolute performance is worse than the unprotected ECho case.
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Figure 17: ECho scalability with no D3P features.
However, performance still degrades linearly with the number of clients on a channel. In
particular, the degradation is less noticeable (more fully amortized) as the number of sub-
scribers increases. This is attributable to the fact that the added D3P protection operations
(verification of capability integrity and rights) have most of their impact outside the “fast
path” of data transfer (at channel subscription time or handler installation time). In the
data transfer path, a small set of overheads are incurred and they become less significant as
the number of subscribers increases (more and more time is spent in non-protection middle-
ware operations and the network stack). The primary contributors to this set of overheads
are the verification of sender and receiver capability integrity (computing a hash) and the
need to check a revocation status indicator. Both overheads are independent of the number
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Figure 18: ECho scalability where increasing numbers of clients use the D3P interfaces.
of subscribers and are only incurred once per event submission. Their cost as a proportion of
the total data transfer cost becomes less significant as the number of subscribers increases.
6.3.1 Reverb Measurements
For large-scale, widely distributed applications, many entities may be interested in configu-
ration information. This may mean that applications have multiple D3P-managed subscrip-
tions As the number of subscribers grows, it is important that the performance of Reverb
scales in a linear fashion. We believe it reasonable to assume that in most cases, the num-
ber of application clients will be larger than the number of clients for Reverb configuration
events.
Previous research [24] has demonstrated the scalability of the ECho middleware. We
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Figure 19: ECho scalability under increasing numbers of clients with a fixed set of Reverb
subscribers.
executed a modified experiment using the checked access interfaces to ECho, with Reverb
configuration events enabled, and set up 5 clients (on separate hosts) for Reverb configura-
tion events. Quantities measured were the amount of CPU and wall-clock time consumed in
performing a scripted series of AVS actions (which resulted in a set of configuration changes
for which audit information is generated along the RChannel), during which a fixed num-
ber of image frames were received. As shown in Figure 18, performance degrades roughly
linearly with the number of clients on a channel. In particular, the degradation is less no-
ticeable (more fully amortized) as the number of subscribers increases. This is attributable
to the fact that Reverb communication is increasingly dominated by the “data path” as the
number of image subscribers increases.
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6.3.2 Customization
As described earlier, a key feature of Reverb is the ability for subscribers to get information
differentially ; that is, they can tune the Reverb data stream to receive exactly the proportion
of events they are interested in. Previous research [52] details the benefits of discarding
traffic at the source instead of the sink, and Reverb channel customization leverages this
concept.
This experiment repeatedly increased the number of subscribers of the RChannel, di-
viding them into halves which discard differing proportions of the channel traffic. For each
amount of subscribers, a scripted series of AVS actions, designed to produce a number of
update events, was repeated. Quantities measured were CPU and wall-clock time consumed
in RChannel operations. In the first set of tests, half of the clients discard 20% of Reverb
traffic and the other half discards 80%. The second set of tests changes these proportions
to 50% and 80%, respectively. These results are available in Figures 20 and 21.
These results illustrate that the performance of the D3P/Reverb system scales in a linear
fashion even as customization actions are being performed. This is significant because it is
highly likely that Reverb clients will only be interested in a subset of configuration events,
and therefore that customizations will be installed on the RChannel. Furthermore, it is also
likely that clients will be interested in different subsets of events, and these results illustrate
linear scalability even under such conditions.
6.4 XMIT Evaluation
D3P uses the XMIT metadata toolkit to represent structured type definitions in a manner
independent of any particular middleware library. This approach provides usability benefits
to applications which can use XMIT’s XML Schema-derived syntax for defining type struc-
tures. As D3P relies heavily on XML documents that specify handler and policy metadata,
and also on conversions between user-specified types to enforce protection decisions, XMIT
is a natural choice for D3P.
We have constructed a set of experiments and used them to evaluate XMIT’s perfor-
mance. Our results indicate that using XML as a metadata definition language can yield a
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Server Scalability − Multiple Client Customizations (20%/80%)









Figure 20: Server scalability where half of the clients discard 20% of Reverb traffic and
half discard 80%.
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Server Scalability − Multiple Client Customizations (50%/80%)









Figure 21: Server scalability where half of the clients discard 50% of Reverb traffic and
half discard 80%.
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large gain in usability with almost no performance penalty:
• Binary transmission of structured messages is superior in almost every case to using
XML as a wire format. This holds except when senders and receivers use XML directly,
when they transmit messages as unstructured ASCII, and when these messages are
small. In this case, the additional overheads implied by the use of XMIT outweigh
the benefits attained from the improved efficiency of binary transport.
• For the high performance applications and usage scenarios for which XMIT was de-
veloped (e.g., for D3P applications such as AVS), we have experienced superior per-
formance for binary transport using XMIT even when binary transport performs in
its worst case (small messages, encoding/decoding required at both ends) and XML
transport is at its best (small messages, no encoding/decoding required). In one
application-based experiment, XML messages are 3 times larger than the correspond-
ing binary messages (see Figure 22 for the structure definition and XML encoding),



















Figure 22: A C structure defining a sample structure representing an image, and a sam-
ple XML encoding of the structure. The XML expansion results in a considerably larger
representation of the data, significant when exchanging many messages.
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The introduction of XML-based metadata into D3P, whose communication is performed
using PBIO for wire-formatting, adds no additional overhead to data transport. For this
reason, it is not meaningful to compare communications times of applications with and
without such metadata. Any metadata-related overhead occurs only at program startup;
since the approach we describe uses PBIO format registrations derived from the provided
XML format descriptions, PBIO-based communications can continue as if normal PBIO
metadata were being used. This allows any increased cost of discovery and registration to
be amortized across the entire set of messages sent using a particular metadata format.
As the number of messages sent in a particular format can reasonably be expected to
dominate the number of format discoveries and changes, the overall effect on performance
should be tolerable. Note also that in both compiled-metadata and IDL-metadata systems,
format changes require manual intervention at every source and sink point (in the form of
recompilation of systems that cannot cope with the format changes).
The impact of using XMIT lies in the additional time required to retrieve XML Schema-
based metadata and the time required to parse and construct PBIO metadata. We define
the Remote Discovery Multiplier (RDM) as the ratio of the time needed by XMIT to
register a message format with respect to to the time needed by PBIO to register the same
format using compiled-in metadata. RDM provides an indication of the cost of remote meta-
data; that is, the quantifiable performance penalty associated with the harder-to-quantify
usability benefits derived from the use of XMIT.
The gains in usability attained from the use of XML for data definition imply only
small additional costs compared to using lower-level metadata representations like PBIO.
In Figure 23 we characterize the time required to parse and register metadata for different
structure sizes. Format registration time for XMIT includes the time necessary to parse the
XML description of the format and register the format with PBIO. Structure Size is the
size of the language-level structure in bytes. Encoded Size represents the size of a buffer
resulting from a marshal operation in PBIO for each metadata approach.
Note that the Remote Discovery Multiplier remains relatively constant even as the
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Figure 23: Format registration costs using PBIO and XMIT.
on the metadata discovery process. Also, it is important to note that registration time does
not necessarily increase in strict proportion to message size, but instead corresponds more
closely to the complexity of the message (in terms of size, number of fields, and nested
definitions). For the sample formats used in these experiments, complexity and size are
related linearly (i.e., the larger the size, the more fields). Additional structure definitions
and equivalent XML Schema representations can be found in [172]. Finally, the structure
definitions for this experiment were retrieved from a local file system. Additional network
latency for HTTP retrieval of the document would increase the absolute time required for
discovery and retrieval by some time proportional to the size of the XML document. The
measurements in this figure show that the additional flexibility attained by use of XML
comes at a small price. The performance penalties implied by using XMIT depend on the
complexity of the data structure being used.
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6.4.1 Impact on Application Size
XMIT is a run-time library that must be linked into an application. The most significant
cost associated with this fact is that XMIT contains an XML parser library. The memory
used by the parser library is much larger than that used by natively compiled metadata.
The parser used by XMIT, libxml2, when compiled unoptimized in our test environment
with GCC 3.3, is approximately 1Mb. For smaller applications that wish to use binary data
transport, this footprint may be unacceptably large. Smaller XML parser packages exist;
Expat[33], for example, when compiled in our environment, is just under 290Kb. Expat
does not provide the DOM functionality used by XMIT, but modifying XMIT to work with
a smaller XML parser would be straightforward.
6.4.2 XMIT Summary
Our experiments support our contention that it is possible to obtain the usability ben-
efits of XML-based metadata without a significant loss in performance with respect to
native binary-format metadata. Furthermore, we have shown that XML-only data trans-
mission, while providing the same usability benefits, does not allow the high-performance
communication that a distributed application using XMIT can achieve. Applications using
XML-based metadata, such as D3P applications using XML for policy and handler meta-
data definition, consequently do not incur unreasonable performance overheads due to the
use of XMIT.
6.5 Performance Improvement
This section shows that the performance of a typical pervasive application does not suffer
when using D3P. We measure the time required to perform 10000 typical AVS image ex-
changes of 921600 bytes (640x480 color), 230400 bytes (320x240 color), and 57600 bytes
(160x120 color), with and without D3P features enabled. Figure 24 shows that, as data
size increases, the sending time increases in a roughly linear manner. Also, the difference
in sending time is smallest with the largest event size, reinforcing our contention that D3P















Event sending time as event size increases in AVS
without D3P
with D3P
Figure 24: ECho/D3P scalability as event sizes increase.
Finally, it is worth noting that at times the use of D3P can improve performance in
applications like AVS. Consider a situation where an AVS-like application without access
to D3P functionality operates under a security policy where certain clients are only to
receive greyscale images. If a separate image stream is undesirable, full-color images must
be transmitted to and converted at the client. D3P avoids this by performing stream
modification at the image source and transmitting reduced-size data to exactly those clients
specified by the policy.
We analyze this situation as follows. Assume an image transfer application similar to
AVS, with a single image source. If PPM images are used, the size of a greyscale image
is 33% of the size of a color image. We consider an exchange of E images distributed via
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unicast to N viewers, where D is the amount of time required to transmit a color image
and D/3 the time required to transmit a greyscale image. In the non-D3P application, the
times Tserver and Tclient required for this exchange at the server and client, respectively, are
Tserver = setup + E × (N × D)
Tclient = setup + E × (D + F )
where F is the time required to execute a function at the client which modifies the image
from color to greyscale. For the D3P application,
Tserver = setup + E × (Pevent + F + (N × D/3))
Tclient = setup + E × (Pevent + D/3)
Pevent is the per-event overhead incurred to carry out D3P-related operations; as noted
above, these include computing a hash function and checking a status flag. F is again the
time required to execute a function that converts the color image to greyscale, and there
are two important observations here. The first is that we can consider this term roughly
equivalent to the time F required to run a similar conversion function in the non-D3P
case (due to D3P’s use of dynamically-compiled handler functions). The second is that the
function need only be executed once, at the server, in the D3P case, not once per client as
might be assumed.
The setup term in each expression above breaks down into event channel creation, sub-
scription, and handler installation components. As noted above, D3P overheads compared
to unmodified middleware are relatively small, in the 4-9% range. Important to note here
is that the Overwatch module provides the appropriate channel capability to each D3P
channel client with the handler pre-installed. Although D3P setup costs are slightly higher,
only a single handler installation overhead is necessary in the D3P case, and all setup costs
happen outside the data path.
This analysis pits the overhead of D3P against the performance savings realized from
transmitting only the required data. In this instance, a non-D3P application complying
with the required security policy would transmit almost a megabyte of data per client, only
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to discard 2/3 of it. A D3P solution provides policy compliance with overheads outside
the data path and improves application performance by only sending exactly the data each
client requires.
6.6 Evaluation Summary
This chapter has presented performance evaluations of the D3P programming approach, as
characterized by experimentation using the reference implementation as a part of the ECho
middleware library. Our performance contentions for D3P rest on the principle of applying
D3P actions, as much as possible, in the control path of applications. This principle frees up
the data path of applications to execute at speeds limited by the middleware and/or network.
We have demonstrated that the overheads imposed by D3P on the control path are small rel-
ative to their corresponding operations in ECho. We have also shown that in the data path
of applications, where actual application data is being transferred, D3P-enabled applications
preserve the high-performance and scalability properties of the underlying middleware. The
performance benefits of using D3P has also been shown, enabling applications in certain
situations to satisfy complex security or functionality requirements with correspondingly
lower performance impact than alternative solutions would require. We conclude with an
evaluation of an important D3P supporting component, the XMIT metadata toolkit, that





This chapter reviews a selection of research efforts not elsewhere mentioned in the disserta-
tion that share design goals and principles with D3P. Our aim is to place D3P in a broader
research context and illustrate some of the features that make D3P unique. We present
related research from domains including distributed computing, software engineering, and
security and protection.
7.1 Trusted Computing
Trusted computing has historically been an area of active research, and is now enjoying re-
newed attention from both academia and industry. D3P addresses application requirements
that are important to understand in the context of these ongoing research projects.
Definitions of trusted platforms [157, 36] promise to incorporate protection decisions
into hardware, realizing an architectural ambition that has existed since Multics. Shapiro
et al. [145] have revisited the idea of making capabilities a first-class operating system
concept, using aggressive caching to offset the lack of custom hardware support. Current
research is converging on differing varieties of virtualization. Hypervisors such as Xen [50]
support guest operating systems with a virtualization layer atop hardware and devices.
Virtual machine monitors [68] export custom virtual machine definitions corresponding to
application-defined trust requirements.
7.2 User-level Protection Mechanisms
[49] presents a scheme for implementing anonymous group signatures which is similar to
the signature scheme used in D3P to secure capabilities. Their method also utilizes a
Mediator process that is separate from applications and provides revocation services. The
D3P Overwatch serves a similar purpose. However, Overwatch also incorporates application
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policy into its decision-making, something not addressed by the Mediator. A version of this
technique could be successfully integrated into D3P’s capability system.
As stated earlier, the threat model addressed by D3P explicitly does not include subver-
sion of local address spaces. This choice was made largely because of other current research
into this problem. Several projects have proposed different methods of protecting address
spaces without resorting to kernel-level functionality, of which future D3P implementations
might make use.
Address obfuscation [17] randomizes the locations of user code and data on every ex-
ecution (via customized linker/loader activity) in order to defeat exploits that depend on
deterministic address allocation. Such a system could be integrated into the D3P handler
execution system in order to defeat potential malicious address inspection. TaintBochs [31]
examines heap-allocated data lifetimes, a potentially useful simulation tool for D3P chan-
nels that might use persistent data and exist over relatively long time periods. Systems
like PointGuard [39] protect against buffer overflows by obfuscating or encrypting address
references and resolving them only when needed.
Sandbox-style approaches [71, 163, 164, 127] can also enforce user-level protection by
examining instructions on execution to ensure no policy constraints are violated. Program
shepherding [105] monitors control-flow transfers to ensure that only desired code is exe-
cuted. D3P provides equivalent functionality to these approaches, restricting unsafe handler
operations through language design and ensuring via Overwatch that appropriate, verified
handlers are distributed based on policy. Another execution-oriented tool is Systrace [130],
which uses an interposition technique to enforce application-specific security policy on sys-
tem calls.
Interestingly, the differential nature of data protection in D3P is approximated in the
on-line analytic processing domain by work reported in [165]. Methods for defining autho-
rization constraints on a multi-dimensional data cube (corresponding to an arbitrary data
structure in the D3P world) are presented, and are notable here for their multi-dimensional
approach. Arbitrary data selections are possible, and potential information inferences from
unprotected data are also detected. D3P provides similar functionality through its ability
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to associate handlers that can convert data from one type to another, masking data from
which inferences might be drawn. The operating system-level, policy-driven and type-based
protection system used in Security-Enhanced Linux is described in [97].
7.3 Security Policy Implementation and Management
D3P’s Overwatch module has the task of interpreting arbitrary policy statements and pro-
ducing decisions about which handlers to install on which data streams. This requires
exact data type information both at the policy interpretation level (brokering) and at the
implementation level (for protection services). In [112], this is referred to as a crisp data
model. They propose the use of fuzzy set theory to process uncertainties in subscriptions.
Where a D3P policy statement might read “a camera must not be aimed between 0 and
120 degrees”, a fuzzy policy statement could read “the camera is aimed at the location of
a warehouse”. Such statements allow the expression of gradual set membership and allow
expression of subjective (and therefore more natural and expressive) subscription or policy
criteria.
The Placeless Documents System [14] embeds policy statements with access control
requests, thereby avoiding the problem of capability revocation. Implemented over an SSL-
equipped version of Java RMI, it decentralizes access control decisions that D3P delegates to
Overwatch. Placeless is not suitable for high-performance applications due to the limitations
of RMI, whereas D3P is designed expressly for those situations.
A concern for any system that centralizes policy management in a single module (such as
D3P’s Overwatch) is the collection, over time, of sensitive information required to evaluate
the policy. For instance, Overwatch might require user location information in order to
evaluate whether a capability for a particular channel should be granted. In [79], a system
is proposed that uses a distributed privacy algorithm to hide locations in a sensor network.
While their work only addresses location, similar concerns over other user attributes are
likely to pose problems for future policy designers, and by extension future Overwatch
designers.
In [82], a detailed access control design for pervasive systems is presented that closely
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tracks our intended usage of Overwatch. Their design also incorporates elements of data
protection or transformation between access control elements (obfuscating or generalizing
user location information, for example) that is similar to the data protection actions accom-
plished by D3P, as well as emphasis on application-semantic (referred to as “information-
level”) policy definition. Decoupling of access control policy and mechanism is also covered
in their work. D3P is complementary to this effort, with the advantage of a concrete imple-
mentation of mechanism in high-performance middleware. Their design presents interesting
opportunities for future research in the D3P context. The Confab system [85] addresses
similar privacy concerns in ubiquitous and pervasive applications. For Grid applications,
the SESAME [180] system uses existing Grid security technology to implement context-
dependent authentication under a dynamic RBAC access control model.
Delegation of privileges is not currently addressed by D3P, but the design of Overwatch
allows the construction of policy to realize it. If D3P capabilities are extended with appro-
priate data, approaches that allow them to carry references to externally-defined delegation
constraints [15] are possible. In [101], an interesting approach to incorporating foreign prin-
cipals into an access control matrix is proposed. Implemented in a global file system, users
can register identity information with local authentication authorities; these identities can
then be used in access control decisions without the need to contact a central authority (as
is necessary to follow a certificate chain). D3P is compatible with this approach, allowing
arbitrary identification information to be embedded into capabilities.
D3P can be used to implement higher-level application frameworks used for specific
application types. A similar system that addresses computer-supported collaborative work
(CSCW) applications is presented in [156]. It derives specific workflow architecture and
event-subscriptions for components from a functional policy specification. Role-based access
control is used to determine which workflow components have access to which information
flows. Unlike D3P, their work does not support differential data access to objects. Also,
their Java implementation is unsuitable for the data-intensive, high-performance applica-
tion domains targeted by D3P. The DisCo [61] system is another Java-based middleware
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supporting authorized access to application components. DisCo employs an Overwatch-
like monitor process (Authorizer) and claims to address rights revocation concerns through
component references, although exactly how this is accomplished is unclear. A policy-driven
middleware framework developed explicitly for publish/subscribe applications is described
in [118], and a system providing D3P-style protection and policy implementation for foreign
executable content (although not data protection) is presented in [96]
In [65], Furst et al. provide a look at how enterprise-level access control might be realized
in a Java RMI/RBAC environment. Their main issue is to consider the widely-distributed
nature of enterprise data and how it intersects with policy role definition. The combination
of appropriate extensions to Overwatch (currently being explored as further work) will make
D3P a strong competitor in this regard, with the added benefits of high-performance and
compact data representation. [37] presents a policy-definition architecture that is a useful
example of the type D3P is designed to support.
The use of XML as a policy definition tool has also been a subject of previous work. [44]
introduces a method of defining access restrictions on Web documents using XML. The Job
Submission Description Language [100] is a XML dialect supporting brokering information
of the type used by Overwatch. The Security Services Markup Language[120] proposes
a method for expressing security models in XML. Additionally, although based on UML
rather than on XML, QML[63] presented a method of describing system-level policies in an
abstract fashion.
7.4 Protected Audit Systems
Perhaps the most widely used tool related to Reverb is the syslog [4] service. syslog pro-
vides a basic transport protocol for transmission of events across IP networks. It is intended
as a lowest-common-denominator service with goals of widespread applicability and low co-
ordination requirements. More directly related to Reverb, syslog provides anonymous,
“fire-and-forget” event communication and a structure for definition of audit processors.
In contrast to this and similar services, Reverb makes use of binary messaging as opposed
to syslog’s text-based format, and allows arbitrary event structures to be defined. Also,
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Reverb supports the introduction of user functionality into the event transmission path.
A large body of recent academic research has addressed the introduction of autonomic
principles into Web Services [19, 155], middleware for pervasive and context-sensitive appli-
cations [89], and security [104]. These principles are also appearing in significant commercial
offerings such as IBM’s Websphere [92] and HP’s OpenView [84]. Each of these efforts con-
cerns systems that can “self-heal” or otherwise respond to configuration changes without
manual intervention. Reverb is a complementary piece in this area of research, adding its
high-performance and customization middleware abilities to the discussion. Also of interest
are policy definition and management efforts [90] which can inform future improvements
into designs of modules such as Reverb’s Overwatch.
Grid services is another area where the middleware approach of Reverb can contribute.
The Globus and Legion projects aim to make large sets of distributed resources manage-
able. Particularly, Legion research [56] and tools such as Condor [62] have begun to address
questions surrounding the security of Grid schedulers and other configuration aspects of
metacomputing environments. Reverb provides a flexible policy-driven approach to secur-
ing configuration information by limiting access to the RChannel. Policy management as
encapsulated by the Overwatch module could be modified to explore compatibility modes
with these types of Grid services.
Finally, Reverb provides access control to audit information in a manner complementary
to encryption-based schemes such as that described in [142]. If forensic analysis of audit
data is to be reliable, the integrity of the audit trail is paramount. Reverb addresses this
issue both through access control and differential data access (which makes possible audit
processing components that are smaller and therefore more amenable to inspection). [147]
describes an auditing infrastructure that distributes log information among several receiving
nodes so as to detect compromise of any individual node. The Reverb subsystem can be used




Various projects have proposed component-based approaches to software development in
wide-area distributed computing [20, 81, 22]. Component architectures facilitate the con-
struction of complex applications by allowing the creation of generic reusable components
and by easing independent component development. Similar approaches have been proposed
by the software engineering community over the last decade [126, 146] and their advantages
have been widely recognized in industry, resulting in the development of systems such as
Enterprise Java Beans [153], Microsoft’s Component Object Model and its distributed ex-
tension (DCOM) [51], and the developing specification of the CORBA Component Model
(CCM) in OMG’s CORBA version 3.0 [122].
Targeted to Grid computing environments, CCA [22] proposes an approach to building
distributed systems that is based on representing services as application-level software com-
ponents. The WebFlow [81] project aims to provide a Java-based coarse grain packaging
model and framework for authoring wide-area distributed applications. Blair et al. [20] pro-
pose a reflective-based approach to the design of configurable middleware together with an
open and extensible component framework. In contrast with the component-based model
advanced by D3P, all of these projects follow a coarse-grain, object-based approach to
composition and have no provision for adaptation to changing environmental conditions or
application requirements. Arguments in [78] contend that an object-oriented approach may
not be best-suited to wide-area distributed computing, as it may complicate application
programmability and evolution.
7.5.2 Publish/Subscribe
The publish-subscribe paradigm supported by event services is well-suited to the reactive
nature of many novel applications. Publish/subscribe enables the rapid and dynamic inte-
gration of legacy software into distributed systems [123], supports software reuse, facilitates
software evolution [70, 69], aids in the scalability and fault-tolerance the system and is a
good fit for component-based approaches.
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D3P provides communication and component integration through its use of the ECho
middleware library. There exist many research efforts also targeted at the development of
event notification systems and their use for component integration. Notable among these
are IBM’s Gryphon [151], Siena [27], Elvin [143], JEDI [41], JECho [182], and the work by
Yu et al [178]. ECho is unique in its support of flexible and high performance event-based
communication in heterogeneous environments. In addition, D3P/ECho enables dynamic,
client-specific differentiation of application data streams through the instantiation of handler
functions at channel sources.
7.6 Active and Adaptive Systems
D3P introduces functionality into the data path of applications in order to provide its unique
benefits. This functionality is attached to a system component, most often the source of
data, and so makes the system active. There is a large body of recent and mature research
into such systems. Active Messages [162] are bound to user-level processing which extracts
the message from the network and inserts it into an on-going computation. Several projects
have extended activity to the network path [11, 18, 10] (so-called active networks [154])
and also to the messages within the network [95, 169]. Other introductions of activity
into systems include I/O streams or disks [6, 133, 103], service definitions [72, 12], and
name-to-service brokering [158].
Adaptive systems also rely on functionality in the datapath to achieve their goals. Com-
panion research to D3P [25] has made note of the ancestry of datapath adaptivity, prim-
itively realized in early operating systems such as Unix [134] and the Dartmouth Time-
Sharing System [45]. D3P extends these primitive notions by applying data distribution
and datapath adaptation to distributed applications, and by providing mechanisms to im-
plement application-dependent policy.
Rover [98] implements a proxy-based architecture specifically tuned for client-server,
mobile applications. The system uses Queued Remote Procedure Calls to overcome periods
of dis-connectivity and to better utilize the network link by scheduling transactions intelli-
gently. Rover also makes use of Relocatable Dynamic Objects to offload some resources by,
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for example, trading upstream compression for network bandwidth savings. Rover has no
provision for run-time adaptation to changing environmental conditions.
Odyssey [121] is another application-aware approach to adaptation intended primarily
to assist client/server interaction in mobile environments. The Odyssey system consists of a
viceroy, for resource management; a set of type-specific wardens that handle the intercom-
munication between clients and servers; and applications that negotiate with Odyssey to
receive the best level of service availability. Odyssey has no consideration for the dynamic
insertion and composition of wardens and provides no support for dynamic composition of
adaptation across multiple nodes, making it not flexible enough to cope with the character-
istics of our target environments.
The TranSend [59] proxy addresses both network and system heterogeneity by provid-
ing an extra level of indirection in the transfer paths between clients and servers. Proxies
transform retrieved data, primarily images, to representation that best suit the client con-
nectivity. In the TranSend architecture, clients rendezvous with the system through a front
end. The front end contacts the load manager, which deploys transcoders on behalf of the
users. Similar to the two previous projects, TranSend provides no support for dynamic
composition of adaptation across multiple nodes.
Zenel and Duchamp [179] describe a general design of a proxy-based architecture that
includes the notion of “filters” at an intermediate host or proxy server. While the archi-
tecture is relatively general, their system does not address issues of multiple coordinated
adaptations.
DataCutter [16] is a middleware infrastructure that provides support for processing of
large datasets from archival storage systems over wide-area networks. The project’s main
focus is on access to archival storage data, including support for indexing and accessing of
multidimensional datasets. As with D3P, an application processing structure is decomposed
into a set of processes, called filters, following a stream-based programming model derived
from the research group’s earlier work on active disks [6]. However, the framework is
fundamentally proxy-based and does not consider run-time adaptation to variations on
environmental conditions.
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Proxy-based solutions have demonstrated the potential benefits of using the process-
ing power available on the datapath, as they depart slightly from the basic client/server
model by introducing a third entity, the proxy server. New environments provide additional
processing units in the datapath, a potentially greater number of idle hosts and a longer,
more complex network connecting clients and servers. These characteristics indicate the
need for more general multi-point approach to adaptation. Although multiple proxies could
be distributed over the datapath, the paradigm provides no assistance in making them
cooperate.
Conductor [175] provides an application transparent adaptation framework that allows
multiple adaptation-modules spread along the datapath between application and services.
Conductor proposes the automatic deployment of multiple application-transparent adap-
tors over the datapath. Although this transparency insures backward compatibility it also
limits their flexibility. In contrast to this, Active Services [12] allows client applications to
explicitly start one or more services on their behalf that can transform the data they receive
from end services.
Ninja [73] proposes a data flow model for composing services that is similar to the model
underlying D3P. However, Ninja is intended to provide robust cluster-based services, and it
does not consider dynamic adaptation of data paths or of the paths’ components.
CANS [64] is an application-level framework for injecting application-level functionality
into the datapath. The CANS infrastructure is closely related to D3P as both support the
dynamic composition of application functionality over datapaths as well as their run-time
adaptation to changing environmental conditions. CANS proposes an interesting extended-
type-based composition to automate component selection based on links characteristics.
The CANS infrastructure has been implemented on Windows 2000 and uses Java VM as the
execution environment at its intermediate hosts. D3P and CANS differ in various important
aspects: D3P focuses on wide-area, heterogeneous, and highly-dynamic environments; D3P
adopts event-based techniques for component integration; and D3P explicitly targets high-




This chapter summarizes the key contributions of dynamic differential data protection pre-
sented in this dissertation. We briefly describe the design philosophy of D3P and discuss
its primary benefits for applications in the high-performance and pervasive domains. We
also identify future research opportunities.
8.1 Summary
This dissertation defines dynamic differential data protection, a novel method of providing
data manipulation and protection functionality to applications. The application domains
considered in this dissertation include the high-performance and pervasive areas, but D3P
is also applicable in other areas such as enterprise systems. D3P provides data protection
at the middleware level, and provides a mechanism that enforces application-specific policy
statements. Our approach accomplishes this through the combination of three concepts:
secure references to middleware objects, a data type system that supports reflection, and a
model for incorporating system extensions in a protected manner.
We present case studies of how D3P directly addresses important data protection and
functionality issues encountered by representative applications. D3P makes possible appli-
cation designs and implementations which are vital to the successful fulfillment of require-
ments driven by execution conditions or application security policy. The threat models of
these applications were considered and the benefits of D3P outlined. D3P does not provide
memory-based protection of application objects or complete code isolation for application
extensions. However, there is considerable research into these areas which can be integrated
into a D3P application without difficulty. Furthermore, D3P provides protection against
important classes of protection threats involving access to data streams and unchecked
disclosure of application data types.
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We report on the reference implementation of D3P in a mature, modern publish/subscribe
middleware package. Performing this implementation automatically provides several bene-
fits, among them being the cross-platform and standards-based infrastructure on which D3P
is built. We describe how the middleware was modified in order to provide secure references
to objects, to incorporate the binary wire-formatting system in use, and to provide dynamic
system extension facilities. We also provide detail on the policy management component of
D3P, the Overwatch module. The implementation of the Reverb middleware audit facility,
based on the core of D3P, is described. Reverb provides applications with an alternative to
D3P’s extremely fine-grained access control, enabling designs where configuration changes
are addressed reactively (“lazily”) instead of proactively.
Finally, we report on evaluations intended to quantify the costs and benefits of the D3P
approach. We present experimental results on the overheads imposed by D3P in terms of
basic middleware operations such as stream creation, subscription, and extension. These
results indicate that the benefits of the D3P approach are possible and result in only small
overheads. We describe the core performance design philosophy of D3P. We contend that
important protection actions can be accomplished outside the “data path” of applications,
and therefore the cost of such actions can be amortized over increasing numbers of events and
event sizes in the data path. We present experimental results that support this contention
in a representative pervasive application. For commonly encountered application scenar-
ios, application scalability using D3P remains linear, comparing favorably with scalability
demonstrated by the application running on unmodified middleware. We also demonstrate
that as data sizes increase, D3P-enabled middleware retains linear scalability. Finally, we
provide experimental support for the performance goals of Reverb, namely that flexible and
extensible application auditing facilities can be provided in an efficient manner.
8.2 Future Work
Our research into D3P has left several stones unturned. Some of these problems lie in
evaluating D3P in contexts other than middleware, and others in making the original im-
plementation of D3P more amenable to wide-area distributed system design.
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The reference implementation of D3P is in publish/subscribe middleware, but the con-
cepts are valid anywhere data protection issues exist and sufficient metadata exists. Apply-
ing D3P principles to other middleware paradigms, such as transactional and web service
environments, is a promising opportunity. Another such area is at the device level, where
research into providing a D3P-aware serial bus could improve data protection and bus per-
formance for a wide range of peripheral devices. In a file system, computations could be
associated with file objects, using inode contents for metadata, to implement a D3P-like
solution. These efforts would do much to establish the validity of D3P as a general system
design approach.
Improvements to the reference implementation are underway in various guises. The
underlying middleware, ECho, has undergone significant modification and is now capable
of wide-area overlay network communication. Moving the D3P reference implementation to
this framework will automatically give access to a new set of applications with associated
data protection problems. Pieces of the D3P architecture are also under revision, with the
most promising being the incorporation of a new method of safe extension code isolation. A
successful integration of this technology will allow D3P to address significant execution-time
threats.
Finally, questions of application policy management should be explored in order to make
D3P a more attractive system design alternative. In this area, the implementation of the
Overwatch module should be reconsidered in the light of ongoing evolution of the state of
the art in security policy management.
100
REFERENCES
[1] “Common Object Request Broker Architecture.” http://www.omg.org/corba2/.
[2] “The extensible markup language (XML).” http://www.w3.org/TR/1998/
REC-xml-19980210.
[3] “The infopipe toolkit.” http://www.cc.gatech.edu/projects/infosphere/
software/.
[4] “The BSD syslog protocol.” Internet Society RFC 3164.
[5] Abdelzaher, T. F. and Shin, K. G., “Qos provisioning with qcontracts in web and
multimedia servers,” in IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium, (Phoenix, Arizona),
December 1999.
[6] Acharya, A., Uysal, M., and Saltz, J., “Active disks: programming model, algo-
rithms and evaluation,” in Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Archi-
tectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS VIII),
(San Jose, CA), pp. 81–91, October 1998.
[7] Adjie-Winoto, W., Schwartz, E., Balakrishnan, H., and Lilley, J., “The
design and implementation of an intentional naming system,” in Proceedings of the
17th ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles, (Kiawah Island, NC), pp. 186–
201, ACM, December 1999.
[8] Afework, A., Benyon, M., Bustamante, F. E., DeMarzo, A., Ferreira,
R., Miller, R., Silberman, M., Saltz, J., and Sussman, A., “Digital dynamic
telepathology - the virtual microscope,” in Proceedings of the AMIA Annual Fall
Symposium, August 1998.
[9] Ahamad, M., Neiger, G., Kohli, P., Burns, J., and Hutto, P., “Causal mem-
ory: Definitions, implementation, and programming,” Distributed Computing, August
1995.
[10] Alexander, D. S., Arbaugh, W. A., Hicks, M. W., Kakkar, P., Keromytis,
A. D., Moore, J. T., Gunter, C. A., Nettles, S. M., and Smith, J. M., “The
SwitchWare active network architecture,” IEEE Network Special Issue on Active and
Controllable Networks, vol. 12, pp. 29–36, May/June 1998.
[11] Alexander, D. S., Shaw, M., Nettles, S. M., and Smith, J. M., “Active bridg-
ing,” in Proceedings of the ACM conference on Applications, technologies, architec-
tures, and protocols for computer communication (SIGCOMM ’97), (Cannes, France),
pp. 101–111, September 1997.
[12] Amir, E., McCanne, S., and Katz, R., “An active service framework and its appli-
cation to real-time multimedia transcoding,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM
’98 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer
communication, (Vancouver, BC, Canada), pp. 178–189, ACM, August 1998.
101
[13] Anderson, R., “Why cryptosystems fail,” in CCS ’93: Proceedings of the 1st
ACM conference on Computer and communications security, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 215–227, ACM Press, 1993.
[14] Balfanz, D., Dean, D., and Spreitzer, M., “A security infrastructure for dis-
tributed Java applications,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2000.
[15] Bandmann, O., Dam, M., and Firozabadi, B. S., “Constrained delegation,” in
Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2002.
[16] Beynon, M., Ferreira, R., Kurc, T., Sussman, A., and Saltz, J., “Datacut-
ter: Middleware for filtering very large scientific datasets on archival storage sys-
tems,” in Proceedings of the 8th Goddard Conference on Mass Storage Systems and
Technologies/17th IEEE Symposium on Mass Storage Systems, (College Park, MD),
pp. 119–133, March 2000.
[17] Bhatkar, S., DuVarney, D. C., and Sekar, R., “Address obfuscation: an efficient
approach to combat a broad range of memory error exploits,” in Proc. 12th USENIX
Security Symposium, (Washington, DC), August 2003.
[18] Bhattacharjee, S., Calvert, K., and Zegura, E. W., “An architecture for ac-
tive networking,” in Proceedings of High Performance Networking (HPN’97), (White
Plains, NY), April 1997.
[19] Birman, K., van Renesse, R., and Vogels, W., “Adding high availability and au-
tonomic behavior to web services,” in ICSE ’04: Proceedings of the 26th International
Conference on Software Engineering, pp. 17–26, IEEE Computer Society, 2004.
[20] Blair, G. S., Coulson, G., Robin, P., and Papathomas, M., “An architecture for
next generation middleware,” in Proc. IFIP International Conference on Distributed
Systems Platforms and Open Distributed Processing (Middleware’98), 1998.
[21] Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., Ioannidis, J., and Keromytis, A., “The role of
trust management in distributed systems security,” in Secure Internet Programming:
Issues in Distributed and Mobile Object Systems, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
State-of-the-Art series, pp. 185–210, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1999.
[22] Bramley, R., Chiu, K., Diwan, S., Gannon, D., Govindaraju, M., Mukji,
N., Temko, B., and Yechuri, M., “A component based services architecture for
building distributed applications,” in Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium
on High Performance Distributed Computing (HPDC-9), (Pittsburgh, PA), August
2000.
[23] Bustamante, F., Eisenhauer, G., Schwan, K., and Widener, P., “Efficient
wire formats for high performance computing,” in Proceedings of Supercomputing
2000, November 2000.
[24] Bustamante, F., Widener, P., and Schwan, K., “Scalable directory services using
proactivity,” in Proceedings of Supercomputing 2002, (Baltimore, MD), November
2002.
[25] Bustamante, F. E., The Active Streams Approach To Adaptive Distributed Appli-
cations and Services. PhD thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, November 2001.
102
[26] Carzaniga, A., Rosenblum, D. S., and Wolf, A. L., “Challenges for distributed
event services: Scalability vs. expressiveness,” in Proceedings of Engineering Dis-
tributed Objects (EDO ’99), ICSE 99 Workshop, May 1999.
[27] Carzaniga, A., Rosenblum, D. S., and Wolf, A. L., “Design and evolution
of a wide-area event notification service,” ACM Transactions on Computer Systems,
vol. 19, pp. 332–383, August 2001.
[28] Chambers, C., Eggers, S. J., Auslander, J., Philipose, M., Mock, M., and
Pardyak, P., “Automatic dynamic compilation support for event dispatching in
extensible systems,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on Compiler Support for Systems
Software (WCSSS’96), ACM, February 1996.
[29] Chen, W.-W., , Towles, H., Nyland, L., Welch, G., and Fuchs, H., “Toward
a compelling sensation of telepresence: Demonstrating a portal to a distant (static)
office,” in Proceedings Visualization 2000 (Ertl, T., Hamann, B., and Varshney,
A., eds.), pp. 327–333, 2000.
[30] Chen, Y., Schwan, K., and Rosen, D., “Java mirrors: Building blocks for re-
mote interaction,” in Proceedings of the International Parallel Distributed Processing
Symposium (IPDPS), April 2002.
[31] Chow, J., Pfaff, B., Garfinkel, T., Christopher, K., and Rosenblum, M.,
“Understanding data lifetime via whole system simulation,” in Proc. 13th USENIX
Security Symposium, (San Diego, CA), August 2004.
[32] Christodorescu, M. and Jha, S., “Static analysis of executables to detect mali-
cious patterns,” in Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Symposium, (Washing-
ton, DC), pp. 169–186, USENIX, August 2003.
[33] Clark, J., “expat - XML parser toolkit.” http://www.jclark.com/xml/expat.
html.
[34] Colwell, R. P. and others, “Performance effects of architectural complexity in
the intel 432,” ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, vol. 6, August 1988.
[35] Consortium, W. W. W., “Simple Object Access Protocol.” http://www.w3.org/
TR/SOAP/.
[36] Corporation, M., “Microsoft corporation next-generation secure computing base
(technical FAQ).” http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?
url=/technet/secu%rity/news/NGSCB.asp, February 2003.
[37] Covington, M. J., Fogla, P., Zhan, Z., and Ahamad, M., “A context-aware se-
curity architecture for emerging applications,” in Proceedings of the Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), (Las Vegas, Nevada, USA), December
2002.
[38] Cowan, C., Beattie, S., Johansen, J., and Wagle, P., “Pointguard: Protecting
pointers from buffer overflow vulnerabilities,” in Proceedings of the 12th USENIX
Security Symposium, (Washington, DC), pp. 91–104, USENIX, August 2003.
103
[39] Cowan, C., Beattie, S., Johansen, J., and Wagle, P., “Pointguard: protecting
pointers from buffer overflow vulnerabilities,” in Proc. 12th USENIX Security Sym-
posium, (Washington, DC), August 2003.
[40] Cruz-Neira, C., Sandin, D., and Defanti, T., “Surround-screen projection-based
virtual reality: the design and implementation of the cave,” in Proceedings of the
SIGGRAPH 1993 Computer Graphics Conference, 1993.
[41] Cugola, G., Nitto, E. D., and Fuggetta, A., “Exploting an event-based in-
frastructure to develop complex distributed systems,” in Proceedings of the 20th In-
ternational Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE ’98),, (Kyoto, Japan), April
1998.
[42] Czajkowski, K., Fitzgerald, S., Foster, I., and Kesselman, C., “Grid infor-
mation services for distributed resource sharing,” in Proceedings of the 10th Inter-
national Symposium on High Performance Distributed Computing (HPDC-10), (San
Francisco, CA), August 2001.
[43] Czerwinski, S., Zhao, B., Hodes, T., Joseph, A., and Katz, R., “An architec-
ture for a secure service discovery service,” in Proceedings of ACM/IEEE MOBICOM,
pp. 24–35, August 1999.
[44] Damiani, E., di Vimercati, S. D. C., Paraboschi, S., and Samarati, P., “A fine-
grained access control system for xml documents,” ACM Transactions on Information
and System Security, vol. 5, pp. 169–202, May 2002.
[45] Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, Systems Programmers Manual for the
Dartmouth Time Sharing System for the GE 635 Computer, 1971.
[46] D.Boneh, Ding, X., Tsudik, G., and Wong, B., “Fast revocation of security ca-
pabilities,” in Proceedings of the 2001 USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX, 2001.
[47] Dennis, J. B. and Horn, E. C. V., “Programming semantics for multiprogrammed
computations,” Commun. ACM, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 143–155, 1966.
[48] Dey, A. and Abowd, G., “The context toolkit: Aiding the development of context-
aware applications,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on Software Engineering for
Wearable and Pervasive Computing, (Limerick, Ireland), June 2000.
[49] Ding, X., Tsudik, G., and Xu, S., “Leak-free group signatures with immediate
revocation,” in Proc. 24th ICDCS, 2004.
[50] Dragovic, B., Fraser, K., Hand, S., Harris, T., Ho, A., Pratt, I., Warfield,
A., Barham, P., and Neugebauer, R., “Xen and the art of virtualization,” in
Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, October 2003.
[51] Eddon, G. and Eddon, H., Inside Distributed COM. Redmond, WA: Microsoft
Press, 1998.
[52] Eisenhauer, G., Bustamante, F. E., and Schwan, K., “Event services in high
performance systems,” Cluster Computing: The Journal of Networks, Software Tools,
and Applications, vol. 4, pp. 243–252, July 2001.
104
[53] Eisenhauer, G., Bustamante, F. E., and Schwan, K., “Native data representa-
tion: An efficient wire format for high performance computing,” IEEE Transactions
on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 13, December 2002.
[54] Engler, D. R., “Vcode: a retargetable, extensible, very fast dynamic code genera-
tion system,” in Proceedings of the SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language
Design and Implementation (PLDI ’96), May 1996.
[55] Esler, M., Hightower, J., Anderson, T., and Borriello, G., “Next century
challenges: Data-centric networking for invisible computing,” in Proceedings of the 5th
ACM/IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, (Seattle,
WA), pp. 24–35, August 1999.
[56] Ferrari, A., Knabe, F., Humphrey, M., Chapin, S., and Grimshaw, A., “A
flexible security system for metacomputing environments,” Tech. Rep. CS-98-36, De-
partment of Computer Science, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22093,
USA, December 1998.
[57] Fitzgerald, S., Foster, I., Kesselman, C., von Laszewski, G., Smith, W.,
and Tuecke, S., “A directory service for configuring high-performance distributed
computation,” in Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on High Perfor-
mance Distributed Computing (HPDC-6), (Portland, OR), pp. 365–375, IEEE, Au-
gust 1997.
[58] Foster, I. and Kesselman, C., “Globus: A metacomputing infrastructure toolkit,”
International Journal of Supercomputing Applications, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 115–128,
1997.
[59] Fox, A., Gribble, S. D., Brewer, E. A., and Amir, E., “Adapting to network and
client variability via on-demand dynamic distillation,” in Proceedings of the Seventh
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and
Operating Systems (ASPLOS VII), (Cambride, MA), October 1996.
[60] Freeman, E., Hupfer, S., and Arnold, K., JavaSpaces Principles, Patterns and
Practice. Pearson Education, 1999.
[61] Freudenthal, E. and Karamcheti, V., “DisCo: Middleware for securely deploy-
ing decomposable services in partly trusted environments,” in Proc. 24th International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 2004.
[62] Frey, J., Tannenbaum, T., Livny, M., Foster, I., and Tuecke, S., “Condor-g:
A computation management agent for multi-institutional grids,” Cluster Computing,
vol. 5, pp. 237–246, July 2002.
[63] Frolund, S. and Koistinen, J., “Quality of service specification in distributed op-
erating systems design,” in Conference on Object-Oriented Technologies and Systems,
USENIX, April 1998.
[64] Fu, X., Shi, W., Akkerman, A., and Karamcheti, V., “CANS: Composable,
adaptive network services infrastructure,” in 3rd USENIX Symposium on Internet
Technologies, (San Francisco, CA), March 2001.
105
[65] Furst, K., Schmidt, T., and Wippel, G., “Managing access in extended enterprise
networks,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 6, pp. 67–74, September-October 2002.
[66] Ganev, I., Eisenhauer, G., and Schwan, K., “Kernel plugins: When a vm is
too much,” in Proceedings of the Third Virtual Machine Research and Technology
Symposium, May 2004.
[67] Ganev, I., Eisenhauer, G., and Schwan, K., “Kernel plugins: When a vm is too
much,” in Proceedings of the 3rd Virtual Machine Research and Technology Sympo-
sium, USENIX Society/ACM, May 2004.
[68] Garfinkel, T., Rosenblum, M., and Boneh, D., “Flexible OS support and ap-
plications for trusted computing,” in hotos9, May 2003.
[69] Garlan, D. and Notkin, D., “Formalizing design spaces: Implicit invocation mech-
anisms,” in VDM’91: Formal Software Development Methods, pp. 31–44, Springer-
Verlag, LNCS 551, October 1991.
[70] Garlan, D. and Shaw, M., “An introduction to software architecture,” in Advances
in Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, Volume I (Ambriola, V. and
Tortora, G., eds.), New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing Company, 1993.
[71] Gong, L., Mueller, M., Prafullchandra, H., and Schemers, R., “Going be-
yond the sandbox: An overview of the new security architecture in the Java De-
velopment Kit 1.2,” in USENIX Symposium on Internet Technologies and Systems,
(Monterey, CA), pp. 103–112, 1997.
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